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ANTICIPATING PROCEDURAL INNOVATION:
HOW AND WHEN PARTIES CALIBRATE
PROCEDURE THROUGH CONTRACT
HENRY ALLEN BLAIR

Abstract
Despite a vast literature on contract theory, scholars are only just
scratching the surface of understanding how parties design their contracts
in the real world. This shortfall is particularly true of procedural
customizations. Contrary to some early commentators’ estimates, in a small
but significant set of circumstances, parties engage in a diverse range of
procedural customization. To date, however, scholars have struggled to
identify and explain the patterns of ex ante procedural contracting.
This Article argues that the first step toward understanding how
transactional attorneys harness the potential of procedural autonomy is to
recognize that procedural customization functions most effectively to offset
litigation opportunism. By systematically considering how various forms of
customization limit or eliminate litigation opportunism, this Article
demonstrates how contract design can be improved through procedural
contracting. This Article then advances a typology of procedural innovation
that considers the key attributes underlying a transaction, namely the
degree of environmental and behavioral uncertainty present and the
frequency with which other similar parties contract in the same domain.
This typology offers tentative predictions about when and how parties are
most likely to calibrate procedure through contract.
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Introduction
A more complete theory of contract design would anticipate all
possible back-end processes and the interaction among them.1
Commercial parties are generally free to exercise autonomy by authoring
the substantive terms of their contracts.2 A growing number of
commentators have asked whether similar freedom extends to procedure:
can, do, and should parties be allowed to author the processes used to
determine their substantive rights?
The implications of customizable procedure are profound.3 The notion
that transacting parties can create their own procedural rules governing the
1. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 822 (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation].
2. In this article, I focus on contracts between sophisticated parties with relatively
equal bargaining power. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543–44 (2003) (explaining the problems
with considering contract law as applying to “the entire continuum from standard form
contracts between firms and consumers to commercial contracts among businesses” and
advancing an argument for focus on “business contracts”); Robert E. Scott, The Law and
Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 281 (2006) (“Contracts
involving individual consumers raise separate issues that challenge the assumption that their
commitments are voluntary, rational, and informed.”). I do not, however, do this in order to
perpetuate a Willistonian, unitary approach to contract law. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL
HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 8 (2017) (explaining how Samuel Williston
“elevated commercial transactions to the core of contract, and, as a byproduct, substantially
obscured the generative role of diverse contract types”). To the contrary, as I discuss in
greater detail in a separate forthcoming article, The Line Between Mockery and Efficiency:
The Normative Implications of Private Process, (2020) (on file with author), the most
compelling normative objections to private process involve contracts between disparate
parties, which involve a differing balance of values. That conclusion compels another:
procedural contracts between commercial parties and individuals should be subject to closer
scrutiny.
3. By “customizable” procedure, I mean “procedural contracting” or “private
procedural ordering,” all terms which encompass mechanisms parties use to control the
processes used to resolve disputes. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private
Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2011) (describing the process of “modifying [by
contract] the spectrum of procedure” as private procedural ordering). In previous work, I
have used these terms interchangeably and in the broadest possible sense, to include all party
agreements about procedure, including but not limited to arbitration, mediation, med-arb,
and settlement. See generally Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized
Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127 (2018) (similarly using the term
“private procedural ordering” to refer to both pre- and post-dispute customizations of
procedure). Compare Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53
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backend of the contracting process unlocks an additional dimension of
design choices.4 Contract theory already recognizes many ways that
forward-thinking parties, mindful of the possibility of future disagreements,
fine-tune their substantive commitments. 5 By calibrating the completeness
of contractual terms, for instance, parties regulate when, and by whom,
content will be determined.6 Parties use both rules and standards to
accomplish this. They may invest resources ex ante, drafting precise
obligations, to avoid uncertain results; alternatively, they may draft
intentionally vague or open-ended obligations for a court or tribunal to

WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 511 (2011) (describing contract procedure as “the practice of
setting out procedures in contracts to govern disputes . . . that will be adjudicated in the
public courts”), with Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, Carve–Outs and
Contractual Procedure 2 (Vanderbilt Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-29,
2013). In this article, however, I am focusing on ex ante procedural contracting.
4. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of
Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162 (1994) (recognizing that parties can
anticipate and adjust for legal errors in their initial contract); Scott & Triantis, Anticipating
Litigation, supra note 1, at 822 (recognizing the importance of dispute resolution on contract
design and “call[ing] for further research into the interaction between contract and litigation,
as well as future investigation into the effect of other back-end processes, such as arbitration,
renegotiation, and settlement”).
5. See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design:
The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852 (2010) (“[D]rawing on the line
of scholarship that analyzes the rules-standards dichotomy in the design of legal rules, recent
work frames the choice between vague and precise contract terms as a tradeoff in
information costs: precise contract provisions raise contracting costs on the front end, but
reduce enforcement costs at the back end.”); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of
Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2005) (defining the cost of a
contract as the ex ante negotiating and drafting costs, plus the probability of litigation
multiplied by the sum of the parties’ litigation costs, the judiciary’s litigation costs, and
judicial error costs); Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 1, at 816–18
(noting that investment in ex ante contract design generally reduces ex post contract
enforcement costs, and that less investment in ex ante contract design generally increases ex
post contract enforcement costs); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 546 (arguing that it “is
futile to pursue either distributional goals or contractual fairness” in contracts between firms,
as “firms will contract away from redistributive or fair legal rules that do not maximize joint
surplus”); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L.,
ECON., & ORG. 289, 290 (2006) (discussing the role of back-end contract interpretation in
influencing how parties design contracts ex ante).
6. Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 1, at 818 (“The choice between
precise terms and vague terms thus reduces to who chooses [obligations] . . . and when they
are chosen: the parties at the time of contracting or the court at trial.”).
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interpret ex post.7 Procedural fine-tuning extends the same logic, giving
parties additional governance mechanisms to address exchange hazards. 8
Despite the benefits, commentators have suggested that lawyers and
potential litigants do not consider most of the rules of litigation as defaults.9
At least on cursory inspection, empirical evidence seems to confirm this,
suggesting that parties conceptualize procedural rules as primarily
mandatory or immutable. 10 Parties commonly agree on where to litigate and
who should decide any dispute, but it appears that they rarely enter into ex
ante agreements about how they will litigate—at least not in detail.11 Stated
differently, no one doubts that parties make a handful of coarse, modular
customizations by selecting bundles of pre-fabricated procedures through
forum selection, arbitration, and choice-of-law clauses.12 Parties may also
opt out of other bundles of procedures by waiving rights to a jury trial,
appeal, or class action suit.13 But most of the existing empirical studies
indicate that customization ends there; parties fail to devote significant
resources to fine-tuning the processes by which their disputes will be
adjudicated before a dispute arises. 14
A closer and holistic examination of the evidence, however, yields a
more nuanced picture. First, parties occasionally assign different bundles of
7. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2009) (“[T]he parties are exploiting their
informational advantage (they know their contractual ends and have the right incentives to
choose the best means to achieve them), but they are sacrificing the hindsight advantage that
a court might have.”).
8. I use the term “exchange hazards” in a broad sense to mean the vulnerabilities that
firms face when engaging with exchange partners. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 12 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake
the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 612 (2007).
10. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
389, 394 (“[E]ven in circumstances where we would expect them to, parties almost never
use contract terms to vary their post-dispute procedural contests.”); Erin O’Hara O’Connor
et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 136–37 (2012) (finding
that parties to CEO employment contracts rarely customized arbitration provisions); see
infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See H. Allen Blair, Promise and Peril: Doctrinally Permissible Options for
Calibrating Procedure Through Contract, 95 NEB. L. REV. 787, 813–15 (2017) [hereinafter
Blair, Promise and Peril] (reviewing the existing empirical studies); see infra Part II.
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procedures to different claims—choosing, for instance, to arbitrate one
category of dispute and litigate another. 15 This claim-by-claim
customization, while still modular, may refine contract design more
profoundly than many commentators have previously acknowledged.
Additionally, when parties opt for arbitration, they sometimes engage in
greater procedural adaptation. For example, parties may specify
qualifications for an arbitrator, limit the arbitrator’s authority, or authorize
the arbitrator to use a standard of decision other than law. 16 Finally, at least
occasionally, parties design robust and highly tailored procedural systems
that readjust accuracy and efficiency to meet their deal-specific
preferences. 17 These procedural systems distribute dispute resolution to
different decision makers—some private and some public—at various
levels. These systems create feedback loops that function to ratchet up trust
and information-sharing while narrowing the domains within which conflict
can fester.
In short, knitting together various strands of empirical evidence shows
that more intentional and deal-specific procedural customization takes place
than previously thought. The challenge then becomes identifying and
explaining the patterns of ex ante procedural contracting.18
In this Article, I argue that patterns begin to emerge once we focus on the
different risks that parties are trying to mitigate or eliminate in variegated
types of transactions. In doing so, I build on work started by Professor
Matthew Jennejohn. He has previously argued that “[p]arties not only have
to navigate more than one type of transaction cost [or exchange risk], but
they must also choose how to combine different types of governance tools
into a coherent portfolio—the multivalent contract.”19 This Article sketches
15. Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: CarveOuts from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1956–61 (2014) [hereinafter Drahozal
& O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure] (studying the circumstances in which parties
who include arbitration clauses in their contracts carve out certain categories of disputes for
resolution in courts); Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68
STAN. L. REV. 281, 359–63 (2016) [hereinafter Jennejohn, The Private Order] (same).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1873–75 (2015) (introducing three possible explanations for the
gap between theory and practice, concluding that none fare well, and concluding that “[t]he
question remains, however, why parties do not embrace customized procedure more fully”);
see infra Part III.
19. Jennejohn, The Private Order, supra note 15, at 323.
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an initial theoretical framework for thinking about the role procedural
customization plays in creating a multivalent contract.
It argues that procedural customization functions most effectively to
offset one particular transaction risk: litigation opportunism. It then argues
that the desirability of procedural choice turns, in significant part, on key
attributes underlying the transaction—namely, the degree of environmental
and behavioral uncertainty present and the frequency with which similar
parties contract in the same domain. These attributes of the transaction
determine the degree of litigation opportunism risk present and, thus, the
value of procedural customization in any given circumstance. The core
intuition of this Article can be seen as an extension of the logic used in a
growing body of contract theory literature, showing that transaction type
indicates which interpretation regime should govern the interpretation of a
particular contract.20
This Article advances in three parts. Part I begins by recounting the
benefits of procedural autonomy. Theory already explains how parties
author their substantive obligations with an eye toward the possibility of
future disagreements. Part I builds on this premise and demonstrates that
procedural customization can provide contract designers with additional
tools to address litigation opportunism and incentivize compliance with
substantive terms of the deal.
Part II surveys the existing empirical evidence on procedural contracting.
Most individual empirical studies conclude that parties rarely craft their
own à la carte rules or fine-tune the procedures used to resolve their
disputes. Accordingly, many commentators have decided that procedural
customization is a theoretical phenomenon that is interesting only because
of its absence in practice. Part II turns, however, to an integrative appraisal
of existing empirical work. In looking across studies, this analysis reveals
underappreciated pockets of procedural contracting. By weaving together
20. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New
Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 54 (2009) (“That there may be instrumental reasons for
transactors to prefer more contextual types of contract interpretation . . . .”); Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335,
350 (2007) (“[T]he type of contract involved is the strongest indicator of whether or not the
contract contains an arbitration clause . . . .”); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert
E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 23, 96–97 (2014) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context] (surmising that
some approaches to contract design prefer ex post adjudication).
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various threads of existing research, Part II paints a more comprehensive, if
still contingent, picture of the reality of procedural autonomy.
Part III anticipates procedural innovation by identifying key features in
the transactional environment that incline contracting parties to choose
particular procedural governance mechanisms. Part III borrows from recent
literature that addresses contracts for innovation to distinguish between
different types of commercial party transactions, which can be usefully
segregated into four rough domains oriented along two axes: uncertainty
and scale.21 In general, a positive correlation exists between the degree of
uncertainty and the risk of litigation opportunism. And as scale increases,
parties tend to rely less on formal methods of contract enforcement, turning
instead to industry-provided norms, trade associations, and specialized
arbitral tribunals. Accordingly, worries about litigation risk diminish as
parties tend to forego formal contracts and formal enforcement. In short, the
quadrants of the transactional space for contract design present varying
degrees of litigation opportunism risk, and contract designers will
predictably confront that risk through procedural tailoring in different ways.
I. The Benefits of Private Process
[The contract] creates guardrails for the relationship. It doesn’t
solve all things but it shows what the[] parties can do and that’s
important because there is a lot of uncertainty and a lot of
chaos.22
Contract design aims to secure incentives for parties in business
relationships that require commitments over time. Central to the problem
transactional attorneys face, then, is the need to adapt to unforeseen (and
often unforeseeable) events that arise after contract formation. The greater
the uncertainty about the future, the more difficult it becomes for
transactional attorneys to anticipate and provide for contingencies in a way
that courts or tribunals can readily interpret and enforce. 23 Contract theory
21. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 20, at 29 (discussing the
interplay between uncertainty and scale).
22. Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support
Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 1010 & n.71 (quoting
from an interview with a high-tech equipment provider).
23. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 20, at 29 (“All else equal,
the higher the level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is for parties to write and courts to
interpret complete, state-contingent contracts.”).
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has been devoted to understanding how parties adjust contractual
obligations in light of this uncertainty. 24 To that end, theorists have
attempted to diagnose exchange hazards and explore governance
mechanisms available to mitigate or eliminate them. 25 Procedural
customization represents another set of tools in the contract designer’s
toolbox.
The following sections explore the promise of procedural contracting.
The first section briefly situates procedural contracting alongside other
recent efforts to appreciate how parties address variegated transactional
risks. The remaining sections explore how parties customize procedure to
mitigate litigation opportunism.
A. The Design Space for Contracting and the Role of Procedural Autonomy
More than thirty years ago, Professor Ronald Gilson asked the question:
“What do business lawyers really do?”26 In a costless world, contract
design would be a straight-forward task of pinning down efficient
obligations for every possible future situation. 27 Of course, the world is not
costless. Instead, contracts are always incomplete. 28 Transaction costs
24. See id. at 29 & n.13.
25. See, e.g., Jennejohn, The Private Order, supra note 15, at 292 (arguing for a
“multidimensional conception of exchange hazards” in order to assess more accurately the
design of alliance contracts, which “involves a balancing of tradeoffs between more than one
exchange hazard”).
26. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 241 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation]. Earlier answers
to a similar question – “what good is contract law?” — had not been kind to lawyers. See,
e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58, 61 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations] (noting
that business interviewees complained that lawyers often got in the way of their business
dealings, and that they preferred to do business by handshake rather than by contract).
Interviews indicated that written contracts were often highly standardized documents that
were largely confined to the drawer once drafted by the legal department and then rarely
consulted to resolve disputes. See id. at 61.
27. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of
Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) (distinguishing between
“obligational” complete contracts and “informationally” complete contracts).
28. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and Efficient
Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 154–55 (2005) (describing why a contract will
never be “this” complete, including transaction costs and concern with the rules of
interpretation); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988) (“Since it may be prohibitively costly to specify, in a way
that can be enforced, the precise actions that each party should take in every conceivable
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include all of the many expenses associated with addressing contractual
incompleteness.29 Accordingly, Professor Gilson refocused contract theory
by recognizing that business lawyers are really transaction cost engineers
who economize expenses while constructing frameworks to govern their
clients’ relationships.30 In a world of incomplete contracting, they use
formal governance mechanisms to confront exchange hazards.31
eventuality, the parties are in practice likely to end up writing a highly incomplete
contract.”); Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional Perspective, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169, 169 (2005) (“[E]xcept in the simplest and most basic
transactions, contracting parties do not work out all of the relevant details and contingencies
of their relationship at the outset.”); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 595 (“There is an
infinite number of possible future states and a very large set of possible partner types. When
the sum of possible states and partner types is infinite and contracting is costly, contracts
must contain gaps. Parties cannot write contracts about everything.”); Robert E. Scott,
Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 85 (2003), https://www.law.virginia.edu/
system/files/faculty/vajournal/vajournal_03.pdf (“As an organizing principle, the notion that
contract rules are defaults inevitably leads to the conclusion that all contracts are inevitably
incomplete.”); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. ECON.
432, 432 (1992) (“[Contracts] also tend to be incomplete, containing gaps that must be filled
through renegotiation or legal intervention.”).
29. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM : FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONSHIP CONTRACTING 78 n.7 (1985); see also R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, The Problem of Social Cost]
(commenting that transaction costs are resources spent “to discover who it is that one wishes
to deal with . . . and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw
up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on”).
30. Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 26, at 241, 302; see also Victor Fleischer, Essay,
Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 475, 478 (describing the Deals Program at Columbia Law School started by Ronald
Gilson, Victor Goldberg, and David Schizer and discussing how it rested on the notion of
lawyers focusing on deal mechanics in order to minimize transaction costs); see, e.g.,
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2006)
(“[T]he basic presumption that there are gains from trade is the economic foundation for a
facilitative law of contract.”). Ronald Coase’s two most renowned papers teach that
transaction costs are a central determinant of legal and organizational boundaries. See
generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (considering the
boundaries of firms); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 29 (arguing that in the
absence of transaction costs parties will bargain to efficient results). As Coase later
explained, however, the so-called Coase Theorem should be understood “as a stepping stone
on the way to an analysis of an economy with positive transaction costs.” R. H. Coase, The
Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717 (1992); see also OLIVER
E. WILLIAMSON, CONTRACT, GOVERNANCE AND TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 5–7
(Gengxaun Chen ed., 2017) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, CONTRACT, GOVERNANCE AND
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Still, despite many advances in contract theory since Professor Gilson’s
seminal article, the contract design space remains something of a mystery. 32
As Professor Robert Scott recognized in 2015, “[W]e know very little about
the factors that influence how parties in the real world design their
contracts.”33 Early contract theory tended to focus on only one type of
governance mechanism—vertical integration—as a means of offsetting one
type of exchange risk hold-ups.34 But governance problems relate to various
kinds of contractual externalities; holds-ups are one kind, but problems
related to hold-ups manifest in a wide range of specific forms. 35 As a result,
more and more scholars have been investigating particularized forms of
exchange risks and the mechanisms that parties use to address those risks. 36
For instance, recent work related to the braiding of formal and informal
contract enforcement has demonstrated how parties use combinations of
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS] (“[I]f transaction costs are zero then parties . . . would
costlessly bargain to an efficient result whichever way the property rights are assigned at the
outset. In that event, the emperor really did have no clothes: externalities and frictions would
vanish. That being preposterous, the real message was this: ‘study the world of positive
transaction costs.’”).
31. See, e.g., Jennejohn, The Private Order, supra note 15, at 294 (“Any theory of
contract design must have answers for two questions: First, what hazards to exchange must
transacting parties confront? And second, what governance tools can parties use to eliminate,
or at least check, those hazards?”); Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 277
(1991) (“The discriminating alignment hypothesis to which transaction-cost economics owes
much of its predictive content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes, are
aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a
discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way.”).
32. Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3
(2015) [hereinafter Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem].
33. Id.
34. Oliver E. Williamson was at the forefront of this work. Williamson developed this
theory in a series of articles that were then consolidated and expanded in his seminal book,
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some
Elementary Considerations, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 316–18 (1973) (explaining the
variables that likely influence a firm’s decision to either purchase goods on the spot market
or produce the goods internally); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of
Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 112–23 (1971) (same);
WILLIAMSON, CONTRACT, GOVERNANCE AND TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS, supra note 30,
at 7.
35. See Bengt Holmström & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 73, 86.
36. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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complementary governance mechanisms to address the challenges they face
in contexts of high innovation, where it would be difficult or impossible to
prescribe a fixed outcome for a given collaboration. 37 This work replaces a
binary, either-or approach to formal and informal contract enforcement with
an understanding of governance mechanisms as a collection of tools that
can be combined—mixed and matched—to confront alliance hazards. In at
least some innovative contexts, formal and informal enforcement
mechanisms can be effectively braided together to mutually reinforce one
another.38
Similarly, Professors Scott and Triantis’s landmark article, Anticipating
Litigation in Contract Design, explores how parties balance ex ante and ex
post specification of contract terms to “maximize the incentive bang for the
contracting-cost buck.”39 “By reaching the optimal combination of frontend and back-end costs, parties can minimize the aggregate contracting
costs of achieving a particular gain in contractual incentives.”40 Scott and
Triantis demonstrate how these tradeoffs help parties address particular
contracting problems. 41 For example, vague terms, which reduce upfront
contracting costs but increase backend costs, can be valuable when one
party’s inputs would be difficult or impossible to verify, or even observe, ex
ante but will become clear by the time of performance. The critical point is
that, like the braiding literature, Anticipating Litigation honed in on specific
governance tools to solve specific transactional problems. By dissolving the
binary choice between ex ante specification and ex post enforcement, Scott
and Triantis demonstrated how contract designers are able to address
efficiently an uncertain future.
In the same spirit as these efforts, procedural customization gives parties
additional governance strategies for dealing with various instantiations of
opportunism inherent in the ex post adjudication of breach-of-contract
37. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding] (evaluating the
relationship between formal and informal contract enforcement); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles
F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
Contracting for Innovation] (examining the braiding of explicit and implicit obligations and
their interaction within formal governance).
38. See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 1018–19.
39. Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 1, at 823.
40. Id. at 817.
41. See id. at 835–39.
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claims through what has been called “shading.”42 Shading occurs because
the legal conclusion that a party has breached can only be made after the
parties present self-interested evidence to a court or tribunal. 43 Looking at
that imperfect evidence, a court makes a comparative, probabilistic
assessment of each side’s behavior, and the potential for adjudicatory error
drives some parties to exploit the litigation process. 44
Regulating shading through substantive terms in the contract proves
difficult because exogenous factors determine which party will behave
opportunistically. Making matters worse, any effort to design the contract in
a way that precludes one party from asserting an opportunistic claim
inevitably increases the risk that the other party will engage in strategic
behavior.45 Ultimately, using substantive contract terms “to try to induce
cooperative behavior from an uncooperative actor is like trying to pick up
mercury; every provision stipulated or contingency appended just creates
another source of contention open to various interpretations and is thus
subject to manipulation in court.”46 And, as if that were not enough,
opportunistic litigation behavior can also be difficult to observe and even
more difficult to verify. 47
Procedural customizations, however, can make headway on shading
problems. In this regard, pre-dispute private ordering can be far more
effective than post-dispute private ordering for at least three reasons. First,
before a dispute, parties cannot accurately predict how a dispute will arise
or what side of the issues they will each take. This uncertainty affords
parties a degree of objectivity that they lack by the time a dispute foments,
42. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 8; see also Juliet
P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism
Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 48 (2007) (“Opportunism
is made possible by the inability of the bargaining parties to specify their obligations in light
of future contingencies and behavioral choices, and this in turn drives the need to have an
interpretation of the contract in order to determine obligations in a way that curbs
opportunism in light of those contingencies and choices.”).
43. See Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 12–13.
44. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 317 (1992)
(describing that sometimes parties to a contract take a “backward” approach where they
“attempt[] to choose terms that are ‘renegotiation proof’—that is, optimal in all future
states—or, failing this, that are likely to produce maximizing renegotiations”).
45. See Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 6.
46. Scott E. Masten, Equity, Opportunism, and the Design of Contractual Relations,
144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 180, 182–83 (1988).
47. See Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 6.
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allowing them to make less emotionally charged choices about procedures
and processes that will maximize their joint welfare. 48 In contrast, postdispute, parties may seek to use procedural customizations as part of a
strategy to generate litigation opportunism.
Second, transfer payments are much more feasible pre-dispute, and,
particularly, at the outset of contracting. Accordingly, parties are able to
contract for asymmetric procedural advantages, so long as the party that
benefits purchases any such advantage from the other party for an agreed
upon price.49 In other words, parties can negotiate more complex procedural
customizations because they can trade these customizations for substantive
rights and obligations.
Finally, before a dispute arises, and especially during contract
negotiation, parties enjoy the cooperative benefits of a deal-making ethos.
They are thus less likely to succumb to various cognitive biases that might
impede negotiating mutually beneficial procedural terms. 50 The relational
norms inherent in pre-dispute bargaining can embolden the parties to make
more even-handed decisions.
B. Regulating Litigation Opportunism Through Procedural Customization
Pre-dispute procedural contracting can address variations on shading in
at least four ways: (1) eliminating or reducing the possibilities of postdispute opportunism; (2) disincentivizing shading by reinforcing
substantive obligations; (3) alleviating the harm of shading by generally
mitigating the risks of litigation; and (4) reducing the costs of litigation
directly.
48. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1803, 1828–39 (1997) [hereinafter Hay, Procedural Justice] (describing the difference
between ex ante and ex post perspectives when information differs); Christopher R.
Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 746 (“Because no dispute
has yet arisen, the parties can consider the range of possible disputes that might arise in
agreeing on a dispute resolution forum.”). But see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair
Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV.
485, 526–29 (2003) (criticizing some of the assumptions about information access that
underlie typical ex ante arguments).
49. See Drahozal, supra note 48, at 746 (“[P]redispute arbitration agreements provide
greater opportunities for making transfer payments than do postdispute arbitration
agreements.”).
50. See generally Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success:
Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281 (2006) (discussing a range of
cognitive biases that can prevent successful post-dispute negotiations).
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1. Limiting the Possibilities of Post-Dispute Opportunism
Contract disputes generally arise because one party becomes
disenchanted with the bargain that it originally struck. Whatever events
precipitate the regret, if the dispute boils over into formal litigation, the
parties must argue about the legal meaning of their actions to an
adjudicator.51 In other words, while parties often describe conduct that
contradicts their interpretation of a contract, breach is actually a legal
conclusion that an adjudicator reaches after reviewing the facts and
arguments that each side presents.52
The trouble is that determining whether a breach has occurred can be
quite challenging.53 Proof costs are high, and errors are common. 54 Perhaps
most significantly, adjudicators get their information from self-interested
parties and are thus doomed to make their decisions despite a dearth of
quality information regarding the relevant facts. 55 Moreover, the parties
themselves may sincerely believe their own cover stories. As Professor
Scott has explained, “It is very difficult for parties engaged in iterative acts
of performance to interpret correctly the behaviors of their counterparty.” 56
Cooperation may be mistaken for defection and defection for cooperation,
leading to retaliations (and counter-retaliations) that can, in turn, result in a

51. Of course, parties always have the opportunity to settle their dispute, but they will
do so in light of predictions about how an adjudication would proceed. See, e.g., Blair,
Promise and Peril, supra note 14, at 793–96 (discussing the economics of settlement and the
importance of adjudication to settlement).
52. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 9.
53. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 421 (2007) (“Empirical
evidence suggests that judges possess three sets of ‘blinders:’ informational, cognitive, and
attitudinal blinders.”).
54. See Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 1, at 816 & n.4.
55. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 34–35, 73–106 (2005) (analyzing
the sources of uncertainty in fact finding); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY : AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006) (describing
judicial ascertainment of the law as “choice under uncertainty” that implicates “limited
information and bounded rationality”).
56. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 13; see also Lisa
Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 578 (2015) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Beyond Relational Contracts] (“The biggest threat to continued cooperation is the possibility
that a transactor will misclassify an act of cooperation as an act of defection and thus set off
a series of actions and reactions that lead to the disintegration of the contracting
relationship.”).
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tangle of allegations.57 Finally, deals that once seemed wise may, in light of
subsequent events or better reason, seem foolhardy. The prospect of
suffering large ex post losses can produce a form of amnesia that convinces
both parties that their behavior remains consistent with their contractual
obligations.58 The earnestness of such after-the-fact justifications can
muddle adjudicators as they attempt to make important credibility
determinations.
In all the noise, the very real possibility of strategic maneuvering arises.
Parties may leverage the difficulties with assessing breach to extort rents
from their counterparties.59 Customized procedural rules, however, can
directly limit or eliminate certain kinds of costly post-dispute behavior—for
example, by escalating the costs of discovery or engaging in abusive motion
practice.60 Customized procedure can also cabin post-dispute opportunism
by constraining the range of matters over which the parties might disagree
in the first place.61

57. See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 986 (discussing this noise in the context
of contracts for innovation).
58. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 14.
59. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514–15
(1994); Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
481, 500–01 (1994) (discussing how plaintiffs may use discovery strategically to impose
costs on the defendant); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985) (providing a formal analysis of
the impact of nuisance suits); John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 584–86
(1989) (examining “the structure of the games of discovery”).
60. Concerns over discovery costs, of course, have motivated various changes to the
public rules of procedure. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59
(2007) (adopting new heightened plausibility pleading standards because “proceeding to . . .
discovery can be expensive” and “the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
abuse has been on the modest side”); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era
of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2014) (“Since 1980, the
Federal Rules have been amended numerous times: the scope of discovery was narrowed;
numerical limits restricted the amount of discovery; and new discovery conferences, pre-trial
conferences, mandatory disclosures, and sanction rules encouraged closer judicial
supervision of discovery.”); Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855,
858 n.8 (2015) (“Amendments in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1980, 1983, 1993,
2000, and 2006 were principally designed to accomplish the related aims of limiting
discovery and enhancing judicial power to manage litigation.”).
61. See Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 23–24.
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With respect to both discovery and abusive motion practice, parties face
a collective-action problem. In a highly simplified model, each party has
the option to act in an abusive or reasonable manner when making
discovery requests or conducting motion practice. Jointly, the parties would
benefit from acting reasonably. Individually, however, each party would
gain an advantage by engaging in abusive techniques while the other acts
reasonably. But both parties know this and that the other is likely to defect
and employ abusive techniques. In this situation, the equilibrium solution is
for both parties to defect, thereby acting in an abusive manner, even though
that leaves both parties worse off than if they had both acted reasonably. By
binding themselves to a more limited slate of discovery options or more
limited motion practice in advance of any dispute, the parties can reduce the
likelihood that this prisoner’s dilemma will arise and sap individual
resources.62
With respect to the range of matters over which parties might disagree,
customized procedure can limit the discursive space within which disputes
take place. Parties can mandate the use of joint experts, bind themselves to
factual stipulations, or even bifurcate the adjudication of liability and
damages, which would allow them to gain valuable information about the
stakes of a dispute before the adjudicator considers the question of
liability.63 Each of these mechanisms short-circuits incentives for either
party to engage in jointly wasteful posturing or distraction tactics. Instead,
parties can preemptively focus the factfinder on the issues that are most
relevant, or most likely to be relevant.
Other mechanisms are imaginable. The fundamental point, though, is
that procedural contracts can directly prevent parties from strategically
gaming the asymmetry between what they can observe and what an
adjudicator can verify.
2. Reinforcing Substantive Obligations
In addition to directly eliminating or limiting the possibility of postdispute opportunism, procedural customizations can work in tandem with
other governance mechanisms to reinforce substantive obligations. By
62. The same logic could apply to waivers of the right to appeal. Parties might well
dispense with a right to appellate review, before a dispute arises, because they believe that
the collective value of enhanced accuracy is not worth the costs. See Setear, supra note 59,
at 584.
63. See, e.g., Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 216–18
(2006) (discussing bifurcation of damages and liabilities).
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preemptively reducing the likelihood that a dispute will occur, such
procedural terms can indirectly reduce post-dispute opportunism. By
altering procedural rules, parties can reinforce substantive commitments in
at least three ways: (1) indirectly influencing when or how a party might
shirk its substantive obligations by changing the expected value of the
litigation; (2) sending credible signals about the likelihood of shirking; and
(3) enhancing informal cooperation.
a) Altering the Expected Value of Litigation
Procedure factors into whether a party will engage in conduct that pushes
the boundaries of what the substantive terms permit or constitutes a breach.
Procedural rules impact how parties evaluate their post-dispute payoffs by
influencing when (or if) parties assert their claims and how they make
strategic choices during litigation. 64 The path to resolving a dispute will
vary based on different considerations. Those considerations include the
substantive law, the parties’ agreement, “the procedural rules applied, the
resources each side has and is willing to invest in dispute resolution, each
side’s estimation of the merits of the dispute, and each side’s sensitivity to
risk.”65 By tweaking procedural rules, parties can adjust the expected
payoffs of litigation and the corresponding incentives to perform, breach, or
shirk.
Parties commonly calibrate the difficulty of proving (or disproving)
compliance with contractual terms by varying the precision of their
substantive obligations.66 When parities include terms that are vague or
difficult-to-prove, like “best efforts,” the high costs associated with
introducing evidence to an adjudicator can dissuade parties from fighting.
In contrast, when parties specify their obligations in precise terms that can
be verified in court at a low cost, potential breachers may think twice about
shirking or engaging in other opportunistic misconduct.
Pre-dispute procedural contracting offers parties even more options for
incentivizing compliance with substantive obligations. Procedural
contracting, in other words, can help overcome the “acoustic separation”
between the ex ante and ex post understandings that parties have about how
64. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
392–401 (2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS]; Steven Shavell, The Fundamental
Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 575 (1997).
65. Blair, Promise and Peril, supra note 14, at 792.
66. See id. at 809–11.
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their future disputes will be adjudicated.67 For example, agreeing that expert
testimony will be given by a neutral third party, rather than through partyappointed advocates, could incentivize greater compliance with
performance standards pre-dispute. At the very least, such contracting could
alter the parties’ incentives in deciding which claims to bring and how
much to invest in proving claims once they have been asserted. By agreeing
to grant a potential defendant the right to exercise an option that would
make any settlement unenforceable, parties could reduce litigation hold-up
problems and eliminate a potential plaintiff’s incentive to bring a negativevalue lawsuit.68 Or, by opting into expanded review of arbitral awards,
parties could increase accuracy (and costs) to deter more questionable
claims.69 Parties could also employ alternative mechanisms—such as feeshifting agreements and burden-shifting agreements—to raise the price of
bringing non-meritorious or speculative claims and limit the risk of
extortionate lawsuits.

67. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (discussing Jeremy Bentham’s
distinction between the clear rules heard by the general public and the need for adjudicators
to have flexibility in applying the rules to specific cases); see also Hay, Procedural Justice,
supra note 48, at 1812 (distinguishing between ex ante and ex post perspectives).
68. See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of
Nuisance Suits: The Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42
(2006). The article evaluates cases where “the plaintiff’s case is sufficiently weak” and
provides that “[t]he solution is to give defendants the option to have courts prevent
settlement, that is, to accord defendants the right to have courts declare that settlement
agreements will not be enforced.” Id. at 42.
69. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24
J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 384–87 (1995) (describing the cost and accuracy of the appeals
process). Importantly, under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), parties cannot opt into
enhanced judicial review of arbitral awards. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (“We now hold that §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s
exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification.”). But section 10 of the FAA,
which governs judicial review of arbitral awards, may not be preemptive. See id. at 590 (“In
holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the statute,
we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching review based on authority outside
the statute as well.”). Accordingly, parties may be able to seek enhanced judicial review in
state courts. See Allen Blair, Is Less Really More? Hall Street Associates, Private
Procedural Ordering and Expanded Review of Arbitral Awards in State Courts, 5 Y.B. ON
ARB. & MEDIATION 74, 97–105 (2013) (discussing five states that allow for parties to opt
into enhanced judicial review).
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b) Sending Credible Signals
Procedural customization can also provide credible signals regarding the
parties’ willingness to cooperate, or the strength of their respective
positions. Parties already signal the quality of their performance by
providing (or disclaiming) warranties, 70 but they could go further. For
instance, a manufacturer could signal confidence in its product by offering
to bear the burden of proof in any lawsuit for breach. 71 Or it might
otherwise disarm itself by trading another litigation right—perhaps the right
to choose the forum, remove a case to federal court, or obtain certain
discovery—to demonstrate the strength of its position. Alternatively, for
example, a tenant could signal reliability by agreeing to let the landlord
quickly obtain provisional relief in the event of a default.72 Or, as frequently
happens, a borrower could signal intent to repay by using a cognovit clause
to stipulate to a default judgment in the case of non-payment.73
By voluntarily committing to abandon what could otherwise be a useful
litigation right, parties can convey valuable information to their contracting
partners.74 Such signals, in turn, can reinforce substantive commitments and
minimize the risks of litigation opportunism.

70. See generally Esther Gal-Or, Warranties as a Signal of Quality, 22 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 50 (1989) (explaining that warranties can signal quality but noting that limits on this
contention).
71. “A variety of other customizations to burdens of proof can also be envisaged. A rich
literature exists exploring the connections between the burden of proof, risk of error, primary
behavior, and cost of litigation.” Blair, Promise and Peril, supra note 14, at 810–11 n.106
(citing key articles).
72. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 3, 24–25 (Dec.
31, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323056 (unpublished
manuscript).
73. See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer
Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168, 174–75 (2002).
74. See generally Shay Lavie & Avraham Tabbach, Litigation Signals, 58 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (proposing “that informed defendants can ‘signal’ relevant
information to uninformed plaintiffs without formal discovery”). Professors Lavie and
Tabbach provide a comprehensive theory of litigation signaling, though primarily in the
context of post-dispute stipulations. See id. at 10–19 (examining fee-shifting provisions,
waiver of claims and defenses, and award modification agreements). The logic of many of
their arguments, however, can usefully be extended to pre-dispute customizations. Although
the accuracy of some signals may be more difficult to determine ex ante, as described at the
outset.
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c) Enhancing Informal Cooperation Mechanisms
Finally, pre-dispute procedural customizations could help clarify the
informal norms that govern the parties’ interactions in a particular context.
Conventionally understood, litigation resolves a dispute by empowering a
neutral third party (a judge or an arbitrator) to render a final and binding
decision on the merits. The threat of litigation motivates parties to hew
closely to their contractual obligations because they will be sanctioned
when they do not.75 Relational contract theory recognizes, however, that
parties often perform out of respect for shared informal norms of behavior,
not the threat of legal sanction. 76 Still, as Lon Fuller once suggested, neither
the threat of sanctions nor the desire to comply with some overarching
sense of morality exhaust the possible reasons for why parties comply with
law. 77 Instead, law and informal norms may work in tandem.

75. See SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 64, at 392–401 (providing a comprehensive
statement of the existing economics of public law enforcement, almost all of which concerns
deterrence); see also Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts):
An Analytical Framework, in REGULATION VS. LITIGATION : PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS
AND LAW 11, 11–12 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010) (stating that the goal of the chapter “is to
compare common law regulation with administrative regulation, while giving due
recognition to the fact that administrators often use common law methods of regulation and
that judges sometimes use methods similar to those of administrative agencies”); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1166 (2001)
(stating that “a primary reason to permit individuals to sue is that the prospect of suit
provides an incentive for desirable behavior in the first instance” and also noting that in
some cases the prospect of suit deters future conduct).
76. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of
Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 449–50 (1996) (discussing the selfenforcing range of behavior); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349,
350 (1981) (“But the real significance of the visible, surface structure of the [ethnically
homogeneous middleman group] lies in its underlying deep structure: the invisible codes of
ethics, embedded in the personalized exchange relations among the members of the EHMG,
which function as constraints against breach of contract and hence facilitate exchange among
Chinese middlemen.”).
77. Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 36 (1969)
(“Much that is written today seems to assume that our larger society is enabled to function
by a combination of the individual’s moral sense and social control through the threatened
sanctions of state-made law. We need to remind ourselves that we constantly orient our
actions toward one another by signposts that are set neither by ‘morals,’ in any ordinary
sense, nor by words in lawbooks.”).
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Legal rules often nudge parties toward compliance with the informal and
shared norms. 78 The growing literature on braiding formal and informal
enforcement mechanisms rests on this notion.79 Rather than competing,
formal and informal governance mechanisms can be combined to provide a
framework that builds and enhances trust over time. Formally imposed
penalties, often focusing on information sharing and constitutive rules
(including rights to termination) are used to grow relational expectations
and norms. These norms, in turn, allow non-contractible terms of a deal to
be renegotiated or shaped by incentives to avoid informal penalties, such as
the loss of a relationship or reputation.
It may also be possible to conceive of the parties’ agreement as
influencing the mental frames, categories, or schema through which
individuals understand and construct the social world. 80 For instance,
Professors Oliver Hart and John Moore propose a more expressly
psychological role for contracts.81 In their model, one party is motivated to
underperform on non-contractible terms of a deal if she is aggrieved by her
counterparty’s own exercise of discretion in performance. 82 Contracts can
help avoid this outcome by anchoring expectations and feelings of
entitlement. In turn, contracts delimit what might be called “aggrievement
risk”—the range of justifiable loss that disappointed parties are likely to
experience.
No matter the precise theoretical underpinnings, contract designers
recognize that contracts play critical roles in fostering informal norms and

78. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 37, at 435 (“This
braiding creates an interactive process that constrains opportunism as the parties’
investments in detailed knowledge of each other’s character and capabilities raise switching
costs—the costs one party to a contract must incur in order to replace the other party to the
contract.”).
79. See id. at 433–36.
80. See Jack M. Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
5, 5–10 (2003) (noting that “there are several different ways that law can make things true”
and then arguing that “law is continuously proliferating truth into the world” by framing or
defining facts or events); Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J.
2637, 2637–44 (1998) (arguing that “[o]ften preferences and values are constructed, rather
than elicited, by social situations” and then demonstrating how law plays a constructive
role).
81. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1–3
(2008).
82. Id. at 5–7.
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commonly include coordination provisions. 83 These provisions mitigate the
risk of misunderstanding by structuring the means of efficient collaboration
and clarifying each party’s role. 84 Contractual coordination provisions
reflect a behavior-based orientation.85 Such provisions specify the parties’
mutual goals and provide concrete, as well as more aphoristic, ways for
them to align their efforts.86 Additionally, the threat of third-party
involvement nudges the parties into compliance.
Procedurally, many forms of alternative dispute resolution rest on the
same core intuition: while parties may need nudges from third parties to
reduce the risk that conflicting interests or misunderstandings will lead to
corrosive disputes, they do not necessarily need formal enforcement.
However, additional forms of pre-dispute procedural customizations could
amplify the effects of braiding, coordination provisions, and alternative
dispute resolution commitments.
For example, in some circumstances, it makes sense for parties to
condition their behavior on some observable, random feature of the
world—in other words, to correlate an equilibrium. The fundamental
insight of correlated equilibria is that parties with sufficiently rich
opportunities to communicate can negotiate strategies that limit, or
eliminate, the incentive to defect. 87 Professors Jennifer Brown and Ian
83. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REV. 1089, 1126–30 (1981) (discussing the purpose and functions of hortatory
rhetoric in enforcing the standards of loyalty and fidelity of fiduciaries); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1230 (1998)
(arguing that marriage is a relational contract and contending that marital vows “describe a
standard of performance in idealized and general terms, and remind the parties of their goal
of maintaining a caring, cooperative relationship” even though such vows are not legally
enforceable).
84. See Steven R. Salbu, Evolving Contract as a Device for Flexible Coordination and
Control, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 329, 329 (1997) (“When parties abide by contractual terms to
avert these costs, contractual control is largely invisible, operating within the private
decision-making realms of individuals or firms.”).
85. See id. at 332 (defining coordination as “the organization of goals, priorities, and
programs for the future, the ordering of the desires and expectations between or among the
transacting parties, and the adjustment of individual behaviors to accommodate the
schedules and functions selected for mutual endeavor”).
86. Id. at 333.
87. See generally Robert J. Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of
Bayesian Rationality, 55 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1987) (describing the role communication and
knowledge of other parties’ planned courses of action play in guiding decisionmaking);
Robert J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, 1 J.
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Ayres use this idea to explain a value-enhancing function of mediation. 88
They demonstrate that a mediator who randomly chooses between
alternative resolutions of a dispute can produce a solution that benefits both
parties. 89
While Brown and Ayres make their point by considering a battle of the
sexes game, the insight applies to other impasses from game theory—
including, perhaps most usefully for the purposes of thinking about predispute procedural innovations, hawk-dove games. 90 In a hawk-dove game,
each player selects between an aggressive “Hawk” strategy, where she
demands her way, and a passive “Dove” strategy, where she defers to
others.91 In a two-person version, both players rank the four possible
outcomes as follows, from best to worst: (1) playing Hawk against Dove;
(2) playing Dove against Dove; (3) playing Dove against Hawk; and (4)
playing Hawk against Hawk. 92 The pure strategy equilibria are Hawk/Dove
MATHEMATICAL ECON. 67 (1974) (utilizing zero-sum games as an exemplar of incentivized
cooperation); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1050–57 (discussing correlated equilibrium and “explain[ing] the
relevance correlated equilibria may have to adjudication, extend[ing] the existing theory, and
then describ[ing] some critical objections to it”).
88. See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for
Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 324 (1994) (discussing “how mediators . . . can create value
in negotiations between rational actors”).
89. Id. at 334.
90. Conventionally described, players in a battle of the sexes game choose between
Strategy O and Strategy B where matching the strategies (OO or BB) produces a higher
payoff for both players than failing to match (OB or BO). The two matching outcomes are
equilibria. The players each prefer reaching either equilibrium to either of the two nonequilibrium outcomes. Id. at 374 (“Even though player 1 strongly prefers going to the opera,
this player prefers attending the ballet with player 2 to the expected outcome of the mixedstrategy equilibrium.”). But the gains from each matching equilibrium are not equally
shared, so each party prefers one over the other. Id. at 374–75. If each player selects the
strategy necessary to produce her desired outcome (for instance Player 1 picks O and Player
2 picks B), the result is one of the non-equilibrium outcomes, which hurts both parties. Id. at
374. Without a means of predictably and credibly correlating on strategy, both parties lose
either by failing to agree or by misjudging what the other party will do. Id. Professors Brown
and Ayres argue that a mediator can help resolve this impasse by randomizing
recommendations and thus giving each party roughly a 50% likelihood of achieving her
preferred outcome. See id. at 375. They go on to formally prove that this solution produces
“more than a three-fold improvement over the unmediated mixed-strategy equilibrium.” Id.
91. See, e.g., J. McKenzie Alexander, Evolutionary Game Theory, in 1 NEW HANDBOOK
OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 322, 343–44 (William H. Batchelder et al. eds., 2017).
92. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

820

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:797

and Dove/Hawk because, although Dove against Dove is a somewhat
attractive outcome, each party could fare better by defecting and playing
Hawk while the other plays Dove. 93
While both parties would prefer to play Hawk, this combination leads to
the worst possible outcome. 94 In a Hawk/Hawk game, the parties agree on
the worst outcome based on their shared incentive to choose a strategy that
could lead to that outcome. But parties cannot necessarily coordinate a
tenable solution on their own, unless they both commit to never playing
Hawk. Instead, however, parties can commit to giving a decision maker
limited post-dispute authority to prevent a disastrous clash of wills—that is,
to prevent both parties from simultaneously playing Hawk and give each
party a roughly equal chance to reap the benefits of being a Hawk.
In short, pre-dispute procedural commitments can help focus parties on
solutions to coordination problems and avoid the significant investment
required in fact discovery and presentation of evidence. Both mediation
requirements and highly streamlined arbitration procedures could serve this
function. If parties elect for arbitration, baseball arbitrations, which
significantly limit the parties’ ability to present evidence, may be a useful
format to follow. 95
3. Mitigating the Risks of Litigation
Parties often find themselves wedged between climbing costs and
unpredictable judgments. Of course, if the risk premium of pursuing
litigation exceeds whatever gains a party expects, that party should be
willing to fully settle. But, as discussed in a previous article, there are many
reasons why parties might want to rein in the riskiness of dispute resolution
but still continue their fight.96 Various forms of procedural contracting can
hedge against outlier outcomes by reducing the risks posed by shading and
producing more useful litigation.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Benjamin A. Tulis, Final-Offer “Baseball” Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics &
Applications, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 85 (2010) (explaining that final-offer
or baseball “arbitration limits an arbitrator to choosing a final offer made by one of the
parties involved in an arbitration proceeding”).
96. Blair, Promise and Peril, supra note 14, at 797–99 (providing three reasons “why
even rational parties might reach different expected judgment values and thus choose to
adjudicate rather than fully settle,” including (1) “judging is difficult,” (2) scarcity of
information, and (3) agency problems).
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For instance, parties might opt to waive a jury. Although using a judge as
a factfinder may reduce the overall costs of adjudication (by eliminating the
time and effort that goes into empaneling a jury and streamlining
presentation of evidence), perhaps the most important reason parties choose
to try a case before a judge is that judges tend to be predictable and
conservative decision makers. A sizeable literature addresses the possibility
that juries are less predictable and produce more extreme decisions. 97 Thus,
eliminating a jury can stabilize litigation expectations.
Parties may carry this logic further and opt to waive recourse through
public courts and judges and instead choose their own adjudicator in
arbitration. Arbitration is, in many cases, quicker and cheaper than resorting
to courts.98 But perhaps more importantly, arbitration enables the parties to
choose a decision maker with greater expertise in the subject matter of the
dispute. 99 Essentially, opting into arbitration and specifying arbitrator
expertise can render litigation even more predictable, in certain
circumstances, than if the parties tried their case before a judge.
In addition to selecting a decision maker, parties might reach some form
of award-modification agreement. So-called “baseball arbitration,” or final
offer arbitration, provides a good example. In baseball arbitration, parties
each submit a “final” offer of judgment, and the arbitrator must award one

97. See, e.g., John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’
and Executives’ Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (1998) (presenting evidence
from interviews and surveys suggesting that juries are less accurate and more extreme); Cass
R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 102–03
(2000) (identifying group polarization as a possible explanation for jury extremism).
98. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451 (2010) [hereinafter Drahozal
& Ware, Why Do Businesses] (citing Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum
Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008)).
99. See, e.g., Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private
Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People: A
Forced-Rank Analysis, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW. 203, 204 tbl.1 (2002) (identifying arbitrator
expertise as a factor in choosing arbitration over other forms of adjudication); DOUGLAS
SHONTZ ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 16 (2011), http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR781.pdf (reporting that almost
70% of corporate-counsel survey respondents listed “the ability to control the arbitrator’s
qualifications” as an attribute that encourages arbitration).
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of those offers.100 Baseball, or final offer, arbitration functions not only to
delimit arbitrator discretion, but also to incentivize parties to make more
reasonable demands.101 If the arbitrator considers one party’s demand
excessive or extreme, the arbitrator will likely award the other party’s final
offer. This sort of dispute resolution simultaneously curtails risks of
adjudicator error and dissuades at least the most extreme forms of
opportunistic litigation posturing.
Beyond entering into agreements that select the decision-maker or
modify a potential award, parties can also mitigate litigation risks in other
ways. The key point is that parties can bracket the risks associated with
litigation by stipulating to certain procedures ahead of time. By eliminating
risks associated with a decision maker’s discretion or the opposing party’s
extortionate demands, they can prevent extreme outcomes.
4. Directly Reducing the Costs of Litigation
Perhaps most intuitively, parties can agree to pre-dispute customizations
that directly reduce the costs of litigation. By avoiding wasteful litigation
expenditures, parties can unlock a critical advantage of procedural
contracting.
Parties already modify procedure ex post by adjusting the timing and
other pedestrian aspects of litigation. These minor post-dispute, proceduremodification agreements reduce costs by allowing the parties to disperse
their obligations sensibly, avoiding what can be an expensive bunching or
inefficient overlapping of deadlines. But parties can do more ex ante to
simplify or streamline the dispute resolution process. Such procedures may
include the following: waivers of rights to present oral testimony; waivers
of objections to personal jurisdiction; waivers of rights to appeal;
agreements to treat a summary judgment proceeding as a trial on the merits;
agreements to expedited trials with a magistrate judge, or to expedited
arbitration processes; stipulations of facts; limits on discovery; and related
mechanisms.

100. The process was first proposed by Carl Stevens in 1966. See generally Carl M.
Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, INDUS. REL., Feb. 1966,
at 38.
101. See Tulis, supra note 95, at 89 (“Although the purpose of final-offer arbitration is to
avoid an arbitration hearing, it is the presence of the final-offer arbitration process that
promotes good-faith bargaining and drives the negotiations toward settlement, not the
negotiations themselves.”).
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More innovatively, parties could cap their expenditures through litigation
budgets, which could be absolute or scaled to the amount in controversy. 102
Essentially, in such a circumstance, each party could present a proposed
litigation budget. A court or tribunal would then examine the proposed
budgets in light of the needs of the case and lock in the amount that each
party can spend on the litigation. British courts have used a variation of this
system since 2013.103
As with other sorts of procedural alteration, parties can directly reduce
the costs of litigation through pre-dispute customizations. By reducing
costs, parties can eliminate—or at least reduce—the harm caused by any
post-dispute opportunism.
C. Summary
Contract enforcement has long been underappreciated in contract design.
For years, contract theory treated judicial competence as a binary
proposition: either courts could verify compliance with a party’s contractual
obligations, or they could not.104 But the ability of a court or tribunal to
verify a party’s contractual performance is a matter of degree—it is not
dichotomous.105 In circumstances where adjudicators are more prone to
errors, parties have greater room to engage in costly post-dispute
opportunism or shading. 106
Pre-dispute procedural customization can offer parties a variety of
mechanisms for confronting this sort of litigation opportunism. Whether
used individually or together, these mechanisms can work with substantive
contract design to maximize the incentive gains from trade. We might then
expect to see parties engaging in regular and robust procedural
customization. As the next Part discusses, however, the story is more
complicated.

102. See Tidmarsh, supra note 60, at 858 & n.8 (describing the focus on recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to attempt to limit discovery costs).
103. These are called Precedent H Cost Budgets. See CPR 3.12–18 (U.K.).
104. Hadfield, supra note 4, at 162 (“For the most part, competence has been treated as
an either/or proposition: courts either can or cannot verify a potential contracting variable.”).
105. Id. (“Verifiability is a matter of degree not dichotomy; judicial competence is more
or less limited because courts make errors more or less frequently in ‘observing’ a contract
variable or translating an observation into a conclusion about efficiency.”).
106. Id.
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II. Current Empirical Evidence Regarding Party Procedural Customization
Given the potential benefits of procedural customization to address
litigation opportunism, parties seemingly have a lot to gain from routinely
fine-tuning procedure in their contracts. Much of the existing empirical
evidence, however, does not support this prediction.107 Instead, public
procedural rules seem to exert a strong gravitational pull. 108 As a result, a
number of empirical studies have attempted (expressly or implicitly) to gain
insight into what Professor David Hoffman has dubbed “the procedural dog
that has not barked.”109
It is important to note, upfront, the limitations of existing evidence. To
date, only two studies purport to paint a comprehensive picture of predispute procedural customization.110 Other studies tend to focus on isolated
procedural modification provisions, or groups of provisions, and few
studies differentiate data sets based on transaction type.111 Accordingly, the
extant empirical evidence remains tentative and incomplete.
This Part, however, comprehensively reviews the existing evidence and
reveals a general, though still nascent, picture of procedural contracting.
That picture turns out to be more complicated and nuanced than early
analyses suggested. As early studies showed, parties routinely customize
procedure through the selection or omission of coarse bundles of rules. 112
But contrary to what has been assumed at times, these modifications do not
exhaust the range of customization observed in practice. Instead, parties
occasionally make more granular—albeit modular—customizations to
enhance the resolution of procedure. For example, parties may apply
107. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through
Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342 (2012) [hereinafter Bone, Party Rulemaking]
(“Committing to an action in advance can make both parties better off in expectation, but it
also can raise concerns about the bargaining conditions that give rise to the agreement.
Committing to a general rule raises additional and possibly more serious concerns when the
chosen rule deviates sharply from the background rules in place.”).
108. See id. at 1334 n.22 (discussing literature that emphasizes using public rules).
109. Hoffman, supra note 10, at 394.
110. Some limited empirical work has been conducted to evaluate the extent to which
parties engage in post-dispute customization. Some commentators have speculated, however,
that post-dispute customization is also rare. See Bone, Party Rulemaking, supra note 107, at
1342 (“I found very few examples of agreements entered into after filing, other than the
usual stipulations for additional time and the like.”); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 393–94
(suggesting that procedure-related agreements are not as common as generally imagined).
111. See infra notes 145–60.
112. See infra notes 135–39.
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different bundles of procedures on a claim-by-claim basis. Moreover, if
parties opt out of the public dispute resolution system and into arbitration,
they commonly engage in à la carte tailoring of particular details, such as
how arbitrators are chosen and what standards of decision they use. Perhaps
most intriguingly, some parties fashion extensive, detailed procedural
frameworks that accomplish the following goals: (1) allocating dispute
resolution work among various entities; (2) providing for formal and
informal enforcement; and (3) offering intricate opportunities for
information-sharing and trust-building—all while reducing the space within
which conflict can fester.
This Part begins by reviewing the evidence, starting with the two
comprehensive studies. It then turns to a brief overview of what more
specialized studies can generally tell us about procedural contracting. It
continues by summarizing recent scholarship that demonstrates how parties
do, from time to time, engage in more robust and extensive procedural
contracting—creating a bespoke framework within which the integrity and
meaning of their contracts is tested and refined. Finally, this Part concludes
by tying all the threads together to provide a mosaic of procedural
contracting.
A. Two Comprehensive Studies of Procedural Contracting
The first study to examine the waterfront of procedural contracting was
conducted by Professor Hoffman in 2014.113 While extremely useful as a
starting point, this study ultimately caries only limited empirical weight, as
Hoffman himself acknowledged.114 He conducted broad keyword searches
of material contracts filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).115 Consequently, his research does not provide precise information
113. Though Professor Hoffman’s review is extensive, it excludes analysis of arbitration
clauses. Hoffman, supra note 10, at 395 (“Most importantly, I am not going to talk much
about contracts containing arbitration clauses.”). As a result, his conclusions omit
consideration of an important facet of procedural contracting. His justification for omitting
arbitration is that the more informal nature of arbitration allows for easier ex post tailoring of
procedural rules and, thus, makes it cheaper to forgo negotiations about procedural
modifications ex ante. See id. at 393. This argument, however, overlooks other frictions that
might impede post-dispute customizations and minimizes the importance of pre-dispute
customization on the performance incentives of the parties.
114. Id. at 422.
115. Id. at 394, 404–05. Professor Hoffman also conducted a hand-coded analysis of
1200 credit card agreements, id. at 405–06, but my interest in this paper is on procedural
autonomy between commercial parties.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

826

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:797

about the frequency with which customizations occur or any consistent
patterns of customization. Instead, his study facilitates general inferences
about the relative prevalence of particular procedural terms, but the results
are necessarily impressionistic. 116 While he provided some of his text
searches, he did not give enough information to allow subsequent
researchers to replicate his findings. 117 Nevertheless, because Hoffman was
the first individual to evaluate systematically a wide range of procedural
customizations, his conclusion is foundational: “[E]ven in circumstances
where we would expect them to, parties almost never use [ex ante] contract
terms to vary their post-dispute procedural contests.”118
However, it is worth noting that Hoffman’s own findings may caution
against reading his conclusion for all it is worth. Indeed, despite his
conclusion, he referenced a number of examples of particularized
customizations, including the following:
$

Approximately a dozen contracts requiring parties to plead
particular claims as affirmative defenses;119

$

A handful of examples of parties seeking to control court
jurisdiction by waiving the right to remove, or stipulating to
personal jurisdiction; 120

$

Instances of parties “limit[ing] their counterparties’ ability to
produce documents in suits with third parties—typically, in
indemnification agreements”;121

$

Dozens of examples of contracts where parties receive
“inspection rights for particular classes of documents, whether or
not in formal litigation”;122

$

Examples of parties contracting over evidence-preservation
obligations;123

116. See id. at 404–05 (“In this Part, I examine claims about the prevalence of particular
kinds of procedural contracting beyond those studied in the literature to date.”).
117. See id. at 408 n.123 (providing only basic keywords).
118. Id. at 394.
119. Id. at 409 & n.124 (citing cases that required pleading claims as an affirmative
defense).
120. Id. at 407–08.
121. Id. at 412 & n.141.
122. Id. at 412 & n.142.
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$

Hundreds of contracts varying the burden of proof, particularly
in indemnification agreements;124 and

$

Dozens of examples of contracts “vary[ing] the burden of
production.”125

Perhaps most significantly, Professor Hoffman recognized that parties to
arbitration agreements tend to engage in more individualized
customization. 126 For instance, he found that “in many arbitration
agreements, the parties specified the particulars of discovery.” 127
Additionally, he concluded “that parties often contract to permit hearsay
testimony in arbitration” or waive other formal rules of evidence. 128
Overall, he found that arbitration clauses generally provide more “bespoke
procedural clauses and that removing such contracts from the overall
sample depressed rates at which bespoke procedure occurred.”129
In 2015, Professor Mark Weidemaier extended Hoffman’s work by
collecting and hand-coding a data set of 402 material contracts that were
attached as exhibits to corporate SEC filings between January 1, 2000, and
December 31, 2012.130 He examined these contracts for a broad range of
procedural terms, and by considering changes over time, he was able to
draw inferences about how disruptive events or alterations in party attitudes
stimulated behavioral shifts.131 As a result, his findings provide greater
insight into how parties customize procedure.
Perhaps most significantly, Weidemaier found that parties do routinely
engage in several forms of customization. In particular, in 76.1% of his
sample contracts, parties incorporated bundles of procedures by including

123. Id. at 412 & n.143.
124. Id. at 413 (citing Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 1, at 867
n.165).
125. Id. at 414–15 & nn.156–58.
126. Importantly, as discussed in note 113, supra, Professor Hoffman does not focus on
arbitration clauses, arguing that they present different issues. He nevertheless draws several
conclusions about the prevalence of procedural customization in arbitration.
127. Hoffman, supra note 10, at 411–12.
128. Id. at 417–18 & n.173 (noting that he uncovered more than 200 arbitration
agreements so doing).
129. Id. at 424 (speaking particularly about the Credit Card Database but speculating that
the finding there implied a more general trend).
130. Weidemaier, supra note 18, at 1905–07.
131. See id. at 1908–09 & tbl.2.
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an arbitration or forum selection clause. 132 Parties also routinely included
other provisions that chose between groups of procedures or opted out of
procedures, including jury trial waivers in 15.2% of contracts without
arbitration clauses,133 carve-ins in 23.2% of contracts without arbitration
clauses, 134 and attorney fee-shifting provisions in 23.9% of all contracts. 135
Indeed, even in contracts “without arbitration or forum selection clauses []
most include[d] at least one other procedural modification” that effectively
selected or opted out of a set of procedural rules.136
Like Professor Hoffman, Weidemaier observed that parties engage in
more à la carte specification of procedural terms in arbitration than in
public court litigation. 137 Parties who opt for arbitration commonly contract
over the number of arbitrators, the qualifications or expertise of the
arbitrators, arbitration costs, and at least some aspects of the hearing—
including, such as the location of the hearing. 138 Weidemaier also observed
that a significant minority of parties contract over standards of decision,
which regulate the authority an arbitrator has to decide the merits of a
dispute, as well as other rules affecting discovery procedures, pleading
requirements, and evidentiary rules.139
Notwithstanding his findings, Professor Weidemaier concluded that
“[w]hat contracts almost never do—in either arbitration or litigation—is
dictate the particulars of pre-trial and trial practice.”140 Instead, parties rely
on the procedural rules of the forum that they have chosen to specify terms

132. Id. at 1911–12. Procedural rules are generally provided by the forum. This number
differs to some degree from other empirical studies. See infra Section II.B.2.
133. Weidemaier, supra note 18, at 1922 tbl.4.
134. Id. Professor Weidemaier defines a “carve-in” as a provision “that send[s] narrow
questions, such as those involving scientific or financial matters, for binding resolution by
private experts.” Id. at 1912. As Professor Weidemaier notes, such provisions are, at least
sometimes, interpreted by courts as limited scope arbitration provisions. Id.
135. Id. at 1922 tbl.4 (finding that the loser pays attorney fees provision was located in
23.9% of all contracts).
136. Id. at 1912–13.
137. See id. at 1929 (“Taking these arbitration-specific clauses into account, parties who
agree to arbitrate adopt, on average, significantly more additional customized procedures
(3.4) than parties who designate a judicial forum as the default setting for resolving disputes
(0.83).”).
138. See id. at 1925–28.
139. See id. at 1928–29 & tbl.5.
140. Id. at 1872; see also id. at 1931 (“Yet, aside from forum selection and choice of law
clauses, [procedural contracting] rarely happens.”).
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like pleading rules, evidence gathering, burdens of proof, and other similar
issues.141
Similar to Professor Hoffman, however, Professor Weidemaier’s
conclusion may overstate his own findings. While both studies suggest that
parties favor modular procedural customizations over more robust tailoring,
it is clear that parties who provide for arbitration tailor procedure with more
rigor.
B. Particularized Studies of Specific Procedural Contracting Terms
Outside of the studies conducted by Professors Hoffman and
Weidemaier, other empirical investigations into procedural contracting
focus on limited subsets of possible procedural customizations and look for
evidence about how frequently parties incorporate specific provisions into
their deals. Accordingly, their methodologies and conclusions differ.
Nevertheless, in combination, these studies yield a general picture of
procedural contracting in practice. With some exceptions, that picture
generally reinforces the conclusion that most procedural customization is
modular.142
Strong evidence demonstrates that many commercial parties engage
coarse forms of customization, primarily selecting between (or abandoning)
bundles of procedural rights.143 These particularized studies reveal the
following trends:
(1) Parties almost always include choice-of-law provisions;144
141. See id. at 1930 (“Once again, however, relatively few contracts address routine
procedural matters such as discovery, pleading, or evidence.”).
142. See, e.g., O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 10, at 137 (“[D]espite the robust
academic literature on the subject, real-world customization is largely absent, although we
find some evidence that it is slowly increasing over time.”); Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor,
Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1989 (“[Parties do] almost nothing to change the
procedural rules that would apply by default in these fora . . . .”).
143. See Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1955–
61, 1990–91 (describing procedural contracting primarily as a choice between litigation and
arbitration, supplemented by an election to reserve certain claims or remedies for an
alternate forum).
144. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and
Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975,
1987 tbl.2 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices] (noting that all merger
agreements in sample chose to designate a governing law, as the table shows none or not
applicable to be zero); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New
York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held
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(2) Parties regularly include forum selection clauses;145
(3) Parties frequently include arbitration clauses;146
(4) Arbitration clauses often provide for some “carve-outs” that
allow parties to settle certain categories of disputes in court;147
(5) Parties commonly waive the right to jury trial;148 and
(6) Parties sometimes agree to allocate attorney fees. 149
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 tbl.11 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg
& Miller, The Flight to New York] (finding that all contracts studied contained choice of law
clauses); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 410 (finding over 1000 contracts each year in textbased search of SEC material contracts selected the governing law to apply).
145. Findings vary from study to study, but the numbers seem to consistently support the
conclusion that at least a third of commercial contracts include a forum selection clause. See,
e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices, supra note 144, at 1987 (finding that 52.5% of a
sample of merger agreements included choice of forum clause); Eisenberg & Miller, The
Flight to New York, supra note 144, at 1503–04 (“The most prominent feature is the absence
of forum clauses in 61 percent of the contracts.”); see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven M.
Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 92, 94 (2012)
(finding that 60% of the merger agreements in the sample selected Delaware as their choice
of forum); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 407–08 (concluding based on text search of SEC
filings that “a plurality of contracts choose forum”).
146. See, e.g., Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at
1972–73 (finding that 47.5% of a sample of technology contracts included an arbitration
clause, with substantial variation across contract types); O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note
10, at 161 tbl.1 (finding that 51.5% of a sample of CEO employment contracts required
arbitration of some or all disputes); see also Matthew C. Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication
in a Collaborative Economy, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 173, 197 (2010) (“[Parties to
collaborative agreements] resort to arbitration far more often than commercial parties
resolving disputes relating to more traditional types of commercial contracts.”).
147. For example, one study found such carve-outs in nearly half of a sample of CEO
employment contracts. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 10, at 167–68. Likewise,
Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor found routine use of carve-outs in arbitration clauses in
samples of joint venture, technology, and franchise agreements. Drahozal & O’Hara
O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1966–67 (“Carve-outs are present in
essentially all franchise contract arbitration clauses, nearly two-thirds of domestic and crossborder technology contract arbitration clauses, and about one-half of domestic joint venture
agreement arbitration clauses and CEO employment contract arbitration clauses.”).
148. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an
Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 539, 541, 567 (2007) (finding about 20% of 2800 commercial contracts
contained jury trial waivers, although also finding substantial variance across contract type,
ranging from 1.9% to 64.5%).
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In short, parties commonly choose where their disputes will be heard and
who will resolve them.
Importantly, however, several of these studies observed that procedural
customizations vary significantly depending on the type of transaction or
category of dispute at issue. 150 For instance, Professors Erin O’Hara
O’Connor and Christopher R. Drahozal have observed that parties in four
types of transactions—technology contracts, CEO employment contracts,
joint-venture contracts, and franchise contracts—use arbitration clauses
with very particular carve-outs.151 These parties seek to protect their
information and intellectual property rights through public courts rather
than through arbitration. 152 Specifically, O’Hara O’Connor and Drahozal
find that “parties are opting to have claims related to their noncompete,
confidentiality, and nonsolicitation clauses, as well as their trademark,
copyright, and patent rights and trade secrets resolved in courts.”153
Moreover, some customizations that seem generic or coarsely modular
may, in combination, reflect more precise tailoring than previous studies
suggested. For example, one recent and important paper by Darius Palia
and Robert Scott collected evidence that indicates sophisticated parties
often pair jury trial waivers with forum and choice-of-law clauses that

149. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American
Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 327, 352 tbl.2 (2013) (finding that 37.1% of the contracts in their sample adopted the
American rule, while 36.4% adopted the English rule).
150. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 895 (2008) (“However, corporations’ selective use of
arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against each other, suggests that their use of
mandatory arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that
corporations are better serving their customers.”); Drahozal & Ware, Why Do Businesses,
supra note 98, at 457–67, 470–72 (contesting Eisenberg’s results and further arguing for
differences between kinds of markets); Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock,
Franchising, Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
275, 278 (2009) (noting that the limitation on class relief might be a consideration for
inclusion of an arbitration clause).
151. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, The Essential Role of
Courts for Supporting Innovation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2177, 2185 (2014) [hereinafter O’Hara
O’Connor & Drahozal, The Essential Role].
152. See id. at 2180–81.
153. Id. at 2181.
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select New York. 154 In isolation, each mechanism would appear to be a
coarse modular refinement of procedure that could easily be lumped in with
other routine but minor customizations. The paper concluded, however, that
sophisticated parties are refining their contracts more carefully “to reduce
the back end costs of litigation, especially the costs of contract
interpretation disputes.”155 Essentially, the study hypothesized that this
combination of modular procedural alterations allows parties to lock the
content of their contracts by selecting a jurisdiction that uses textualist
contract interpretation rules to avoid the uncertainty associated with lay
factfinders.156 These provisions, in other words, are not mere boilerplate
language that appears in standard merger and acquisition templates. Nor are
they mere macro-level choices about bundles of procedure. Instead, parties
seem to be evaluating their transaction-specific needs and tailoring their
agreements to meet those needs by carefully selecting bundles of rules and
procedures.157
Overall, these particularized studies demonstrate that parties regularly
customize procedure through bundles of pre-fabricated procedures. But
these studies do not exhaust the waterfront of customization. Instead, at
least occasionally, contracting parties make more concerted modular
changes than contract theory scholarship previously recognized,
thoughtfully pairing various procedural regimes with substantive provisions
to maximize gains from trade.
C. Recent Evidence Demonstrating Highly Customized Procedural
Contracting
Finally, at times, parties engage in robust and highly customized
procedural contracting. Parties often select more granular, if still modular,
154. Darius Palia & Robert E. Scott, Ex Ante Choice of Jury Waiver Clauses in Mergers,
17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 566, 586 (2015).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1950
(“By using carve-outs and carve-ins, parties can obtain a more carefully calibrated
unbundling of procedure than an arbitration clause or forum-selection clause alone would
provide, but at a much lower overall cost than the parties would incur by contracting for
individual procedures. What often results is a sort of middle ground for bundling of
procedural rules: parties choose among pre-set bundles of dispute resolution services, but
unbundle the circumstances where any given dispute resolution bundle will be used. This
phenomenon is common and widespread, observed with varying frequency across a number
of different contracting contexts, and thus deserves more careful consideration.”).
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procedures on a claim-by-claim basis. But, particularly in alliance
agreements, where parties pool their specific capabilities to mutually
exploit strategic interdependency, they also regularly create intricate
procedural regimes. These regimes distribute dispute resolution among
various decision makers (some private, some public) and provide feedback
loops that generate additional information, bolster trust, and minimize the
discursive space within which ongoing disputes can fester.
The segregation of disputes into various categories allows parties to
direct different types of disputes to different tribunals, which apply
different sets of rules and possess greater levels of expertise. 158 This
resembles the coarser sorts of customization that earlier empirical literature
identified—through the use of forum selection and arbitration clauses—but
takes place at a higher degree of resolution. 159 As parties enter into more
complex and collaborative deals, they become more reliant on granular
procedural customization. 160
At some point, when the outcome of a collaboration becomes impossible
to specify ex ante, parties layer in informal escalation procedures, often
requiring that higher level managers resolve disagreements when
subordinates become deadlocked.161 If an impasse cannot be overcome,
formal modes of dispute resolution function as a backstop. 162 Professor
Stipanowich made the following observation nearly twenty years ago:
As lawyers and contracting parties have become more familiar
with various strategies for out-of-court resolution of disputes,
they have explored the possibilities of combining two or more
approaches in multi-step dispute resolution programs. Such
stepped “filtering systems”—increasingly visible in construction,
commercial and employment contracts as well as the voluntary
system employed by e-Bay for resolution of thousands of
buyer/seller disputes—begin with informal negotiation and, if
necessary, proceed to mediation; arbitration or litigation remains
158. See, e.g., id. at 1966–69 (analyzing the use of bifurcated dispute resolution
provisions in a variety of agreement types). Professors Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor
provide a foundational starting point for the phenomena of “carve-outs.” Id.
159. See, e.g., Jennejohn, The Private Order, supra note 15, at 361–63 & tbl.5 (showing
that in a sample set of 146 agreements, over one-third bifurcated or trifurcated dispute
resolution between different adjudicators).
160. See id. at 361.
161. See id. at 361 fig.1.
162. See id. at 361.
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a last resort. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a rare dispute
that survives the initial steps of such programs. 163
This multi-stage dispute resolution approach not only helps resolve
conflicts but also generates information and fosters ongoing engagement. 164
Professors Cathy Hwang and Matthew Jennejohn have observed a
similar distributed dispute resolution process in merger and acquisition
agreements.165 They note that pre-closing disputes are often sent to
specialized courts in Delaware, where injunctive relief is readily
available. 166 Post-closing disputes are frequently bifurcated; while routine
contract-based disputes are sent to state or federal courts, contingent
consideration disputes—including those arising out of a purchase price
adjustment or an earn out—are sent to arbitration, often before
accountants.167
Professor Andrew Verstein has also documented a related phenomenon
in the context of construction disputes, where he observes how dispute
resolution boards mollify construction contracts.168 “Dispute [resolution]
boards are panels of neutral experts . . . chosen by the parties and convened
at the start of a construction project.”169 By utilizing these boards, parties
delegate ex post specification of terms to decision makers who are more
experienced than generalized courts while preserving the option to escalate
a dispute that the board did not satisfactorily resolve to an arbitrator. 170
While a board’s decision does not become binding as an adjudication, it
provides transactional stability to parties by resolving uncertainty on a

163. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
831, 853 (footnote omitted).
164. See infra Part III.
165. Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 279, 328–
29 (2018) (“A similar phenomenon occurs in M&A. Parties often modularize their dispute
resolution by specifying that the forum of dispute resolution depends on which portion of the
contract is at issue.”).
166. Id. at 328.
167. Id.
168. See generally Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1869 (2014). The Article notes that it will be “[u]sing a unique cache of data only recently
made available[] . . . [to] explore[] ex tempore contracting through a novel dispute
management system now prevalent in the construction industry called a ‘dispute board.’” Id.
at 1869.
169. Id. at 1896.
170. See id. at 1875, 1896–1908.
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rolling basis, thereby generating ongoing information and the ingredients
for trust.
Critically, parties sometimes create highly tailored enforcement systems
by selecting modular bundles of procedures and applying different bundles
to different categories of disputes. These systems are frequently more
granular than some previous literature on carve-outs has appreciated. In
addition, designers layer in multiple opportunities for informal exchanges
of information and resolution. Combined, these systems demonstrate that
parties are making bespoke decisions about where and how their disputes
will be resolved.
D. Summary
The totality of currently available empirical evidence demonstrates that
parties engage in procedural contracting with greater frequency and
diversity than early commentators supposed. While the evidence suggests
that a majority of parties customize procedure by choosing between, or
opting out of, bundles of procedures, there are three important caveats.
First, some parties engage in atomistic, modular customizations, for
instance, by assigning some categories of disputes to one decision maker
and other categories of disputes to another decision maker. Second, parties
who opt out of the public adjudicatory system and arbitrate their disputes
often engage in more à la carte customizations. Third, in some situations,
parties design intricate dispute resolution regimes that blend formal and
informal enforcement mechanisms to solve disputes, minimize the number
of circumstances in which they may arise, and generate ongoing
information and trust.
III. Anticipating Procedural Innovation
As the previous Part shows, parties can and do customize procedure in
dramatic ways. But the diversity of design decisions researchers see in
practice has, to date, not been mapped into predictable patterns. As a result,
commentators have overlooked the pockets where most procedural
contracting takes place. 171 To gain a clearer picture of how transactional
designers harness the power of procedural customization, I argue that both

171. See Drahozal & Ware, Why Do Businesses, supra note 98, at 553–54 (explaining the
unpredictable and less elaborate nature of arbitration as applied to procedural contracts).
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scholars and practitioners must recognize the impact that the transactional
environment has on contract design.172
A growing literature on contract interpretation provides a valuable
starting point. Borrowing the typology advanced by Professors Gilson,
Sabel, and Scott, commercial party transactions can be usefully segregated
into rough quadrants oriented along two axes: uncertainty and scale. 173 The
risk of litigation opportunism differs in these four domains. As a result,
rational commercial parties should respond to that risk by using procedural
customization in varying, but predictable, ways.
The following sections sketch an initial theory about when, how, and
why parties will turn to procedural customization as the mix of uncertainty
and scale changes. These sections provide the starting point for a more
focused empirical investigation in the future. But, as these sections
conclude, the theory maps fairly well onto the existing evidence that
researchers have about procedural autonomy.
A. The Relationship Between Uncertainty and Litigation Opportunism
As a general matter, uncertainty and litigation opportunism are positively
correlated. Uncertainty, as used here, refers to the degree of disruption to
commercial practices caused by unforeseeable technological or market
changes. As is customary in the literature, uncertainty should be
distinguished from risk. 174 While risk can be quantified, uncertainty cannot.
Contracts are conventionally thought of as instruments to regulate rights
and obligations. When uncertainty is low, parties, at the time of contracting,
are in the position to understand or articulate well-defined rights and
obligations in every relevant state of the world. In other words, “parties . . .
can develop a shared and unambiguous understanding of what counts as
contract performance.”175 They may describe this through state-contingent
contracts that rely on complete and formal specification of contract terms
172. Notably, some commentators have begun similar projects. See, e.g., id. at 460–63
(noting that arbitration clauses are most prevalent in ordinary contracts between businesses
but are less likely to be found in contracts outside of the ordinary course of business, such as
loan commitments and merger agreements).
173. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 20, at 29.
174. The conventional distinction between uncertainty and risk applies here. See
generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) (distinguishing between
threats where the likelihood of the peril is nonquantifiable (uncertainty) and quantifiable
(risk)); see also PETER CLARKE, KEYNES: THE RISE, FALL, AND RETURN OF THE 20TH
CENTURY’S MOST INFLUENTIAL ECONOMIST 154–57 (2009).
175. Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 984.
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with fewer open-ended standards.176 Or, in thicker markets, they may
accomplish this understanding through relatively stable and shared industry
norms.177
In either case, when uncertainty is low, parties can estimate risks and
address them ex ante at low cost, minimizing the work of a court or tribunal
should a dispute arise that leads the parties to seek formal enforcement. The
parties agree on what performance is owed and only face difficulties of
proof with respect to whether that performance was actually delivered. 178
Adjudicators are less mistake-prone, and parties are less likely to encourage
them, resulting in little enforcement uncertainty. In short, the risks of
litigation opportunism are minimal.
As uncertainty rises, however, so too does the risk that what the parties
actually intended at the time of contract formation and what an adjudicator
can verify will diverge. Uncertainty can develop in long-term contracts,
transactions with extremely unpredictable outcomes, or contracts in which
the parties’ ultimate goal is not clear—such as firms collaborating to
discover new applications of cutting-edge research.179 As uncertainty
emerges, it becomes more difficult to apportion tasks and specify prices. It
may be too expensive (or even impossible) for the parties to foresee and
appropriately describe the most probable contractual outcomes. At the most
extreme levels of uncertainty, in contexts where parties align to develop a
new product or service, Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott have
demonstrated that parties shift contracting to a system that is capable of
encouraging actions and setting the terms of the exchange rather than
merely specifying outcomes.180
Greater levels of uncertainty open the door for either party to
strategically exploit the gap between the parties’ original intentions and
what can be verified by an adjudicator. As a consequence, as uncertainty
rises, so too does the risk of litigation opportunism.

176. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 20, at 58–60.
177. See, e.g., Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 26, at 62–65.
178. Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 984 (“In legal language, we would say that
the parties agree on the law (what performance is owed) and only face disagreements or
difficulties of proof with respect to the facts (what performance was delivered).”).
179. See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 37
(evaluating how innovation-based contracting has evolved).
180. See generally id.
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B. The Relationship Between Scale and Litigation Opportunism
The relationship between scale and litigation opportunism is more subtle.
In general, increases in scale tend to decrease room for opportunism. Scale
refers to the number of similar parties engaged in the same category of
transaction. 181 Where more parties share a particular set of contracting goals
or challenges, it is more likely that they (or some trade association of which
they are a part) will have created standardized solutions that create network
and learning effects.182 These informal (or, more precisely, less formal, in
the case of some arbitrations) enforcement mechanisms can be far more
efficient at regulating parties’ conduct than traditional public law and staterun courts.183
As scale decreases, however, it becomes more difficult to craft
standardized solutions to common contracting problems. With declining
scale, parties become more reliant on formal contracts and formal modes of
enforcement because the prerequisites for relational norms are weaker.

181. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 20, at 29 (“The second is
the scope, thickness, or scale of the market—whether there are many traders or few engaged
in a particular class of transaction using similar contracting strategies.”) (footnote omitted);
Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 983–85 (distinguishing between “well-developed
industrial settings and relatively stable competitive environments” and “relationships aimed
at innovation[,]” which are “subject to pervasive uncertainty[]”).
182. Common use of a term or rule can create increasing returns for users. Brian Arthur
is responsible for much of the leading work on increasing returns in the context of product
markets. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN
THE ECONOMY (1994) (including a collection of his works). Network externalities exist
where “the utility that a user derives from consumption of a good increases with the number
of other agents consuming the good.” Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998) (quoting
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985)). A distinction can be drawn between learning effects and
network effects. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 717
(1997). Learning effects arise when a firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly
used in the past, regardless of whether other firms will continue using it in the future. See id.
at 718–25.
183. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards
a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2329 (2004) (“A more
accurate opening would have been ‘Businesspeople need transactional assurance,’ where
contracts and assorted regimes of contract enforcement comprise only one category of
devices that produce the needed assurance.”).
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Increasing reliance on contracts and legal enforcement, in turn, creates
more room for litigation opportunism.
C. Litigation Opportunism in the Four Rough Domains of Commercial
Party Transactions
While no hard boundaries exist, the two axes of uncertainty and scale
roughly divide the world of commercial party transactions into quadrants.
Each of these quadrants has a different litigation opportunism risk profile,
and thus alters the ways in which rational contract designers will harness
the power of procedural customization. At the simplest, because procedural
contracting is most effective at addressing litigation opportunism, one
would expect to see little procedural customization when the risks of such
opportunism are low. And the role that procedural customization plays
should be simple. Conversely, when the risks of litigation opportunism are
higher, one would expect to see more tailored procedural customization
designed to mitigate the latent risks that lurk beyond every turn.
1. Low Uncertainty, High Scale—Very Low Risk of Litigation
Opportunism
Most transactions involve contracts whereby similar parties engage in
routine transactions. These contracts, which commonly relate to
commodities or routine sales of simple goods, 184 may involve risk but
typically involve minimal uncertainty. In these environments, parties have
little use for formal, written contracts and even less use for formal
mechanisms designed to enforce existing contracts.185 As a result, the risks
of litigation opportunism are quite low, and rational contract designers will
not invest in many procedural customizations.
More concretely, in contexts of low uncertainty and high scale, written
contracts are standardized documents that are often relegated to a
nondescript drawer once drafted by the legal department, and they are
rarely consulted to resolve disputes. 186 The transacting parties operate
184. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 11–12 (2006).
185. See O’Hara O’Connor & Drahozal, The Essential Role, supra note 151, at 2177 (“In
most commercial exchange, formal legal principles and court systems play a surprisingly
small role for transacting parties.”).
186. See, e.g., Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 992–95; Macaulay, NonContractual Relations, supra note 26, at 61 (“Disputes are frequently settled without
reference to the contract or potential or actual legal sanctions.”).
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within large, well-developed industrial settings and relatively stable
competitive environments. This allows them to appeal to established
informal norms, rather than courts, when the need to interpret or adjust their
behavior arises. 187 Stewart Macaulay famously described this process in
1963:
Most problems are avoided without resort to detailed planning or
legal sanctions because usually there is little room for honest
misunderstandings or good faith differences of opinion about the
nature and quality of a seller’s performance. Although the parties
fail to cover all foreseeable contingencies, they will exercise care
to see that both understand the primary obligation on each side.
Either products are standardized with an accepted description or
specifications are written calling for production to certain
tolerances or results. Those who write and read specifications are
experienced professionals who will know the customs of their
industry and those of the industries with which they deal.
Consequently, these customs can fill gaps in the express
agreements of the parties.188
187. Informal modes of enforcement can be quite effective in many circumstances. As
Professor Macaulay discussed nearly thirty years ago, lived commercial practice often
depends on non-legal relationship governance:
Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of important
long-term continuing business relations. Business people often do not plan,
exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much attention to those that lawyers
carefully draft, or honor a legal approach to business relationships. There are
business cultures defining the risks assumed in bargains, and what should be
done when things go wrong. People perform disadvantageous contracts today
because often this gains credit that they can draw on in the future. People often
renegotiate deals that have turned out badly for one or both sides. They
recognize a range of excuses much broader than those accepted in most legal
systems.
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467–68; see also
Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5 (“[I]t
is a delusion to assume that commercial conduct is primarily controlled by what is
‘legal[.]’”) (footnote omitted); James J. White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial
Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1–2
(1982) (conducting an empirical study of chemical and pharmaceutical companies and
offering the “thesis that contract law is a much less significant determinant of commercial
behavior in complex transactions than the typical law student, contracts professor, or lawyer
dares believe”).
188. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 26, at 62–63.
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Professors Gillian Hadfield and Iva Bozovic conducted a similar updated
study in 2016 that confirms the same conclusions, at least for parties in
contexts of low uncertainty and high scale. 189 These parties sell or
manufacture standardized products with characteristics that are relatively
easy to specify, “such as candies, brake systems, motorcycle wheels, plastic
bags and undergarments.”190 Hadfield and Bozovic found that these parties
“paid little attention to formal contract terms” and “did not see courts as a
significant means of enforcing contractual obligation.”191 “Instead, these
businesses looked to industry and relational norms to adapt to contingencies
and respond to the behavior of their contracting partners.”192
Even when uncertainty rises slightly, if the scale is great enough and the
community of transacting parties is relatively insular, the community can
opt out of public courts and into legal systems run by trade associations—
often arbitration—to resolve disputes.193 According to Professor Bernstein,
these sorts of systems may exist in “over fifty industries, including

189. See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 992–95.
190. Id. at 992.
191. Id. at 993, 994.
192. Id. at 993; see also Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial
Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 341 (1999) (noting
prepayment and security as methods for insuring against nonperformance); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 58 (concluding that
mediation is an alternative mechanism to resolve disputes); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519–20
(1983) (arguing that hostage taking is “widely used to effect credible commitments”).
193. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745–54
(2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry] (discussing
how the cotton industry uses reputation and reputation-based non-legal sanctions); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–77 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant
Law] (analyzing “the operation of the NGFA system and compar[ing] the extent to which
NGFA arbitrators applying the Association’s trade rules and courts applying the Code are
willing to look to usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance in deciding
cases”); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 119–30 (1992) (discussing the New York
Diamond Dealers Club and the club’s internal resolution mechanisms, including private
arbitration).
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diamonds, grain, feed, independent films, printing, binding, peanuts, rice,
cotton, burlap, rubber, hay and tea.”194
These specialized arbitral institutions, however, are often geared towards
bolstering informal modes of enforcement. They supply expert decision
makers who rely predominately on codified industry trade rules rather than
publicly created rules (or industry norms or usages of trade). 195 Moreover,
the parties rarely turn to public courts to enforce the awards that these
tribunals grant; instead, they depend on extralegal sanctions, such as the
threat of expulsion from the industry association. 196 Thus, even if parties
occasionally need external enforcement help, they usually avoid the most
formal modes of enforcement. 197
Because formal legal enforcement is largely irrelevant to contracts in this
low uncertainty, high-scale domain, the risks of litigation opportunism are
low, or even nonexistent. To the extent that parties might strategically game
post-dispute informal enforcement, customized rules of procedure will not
be helpful. When uncertainty begins to creep in, parties might deploy a few
coarse, modular procedural customizations to opt out of courts and into
194. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108, 108 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Palgrave Dictionary Article on Private Commercial Law].
195. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 193, at 1777–82; Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 193, at 1731–34; LISA BERNSTEIN, THE
NGFA ARBITRATION SYSTEM AT WORK 27–28 (2007), https://www.ngfa.org/wp-content/
uploads/trade_rules/Arbitration-Study.pdf.
196. See, e.g., Bernstein, Palgrave Dictionary Article on Private Commercial Law, supra
note 194, at 109 (“In most industries, however, it is rarely necessary for a party to seek
judicial enforcement of an award. Merchant tribunals are able to place their own pressures
on the parties to comply promptly with their decisions.”); Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 193, at 1737–38 (observing that it “is rarely
necessary” to seek enforcement of awards in court; instead threat of expulsion is “usually
sufficient to induce merchants to promptly comply with arbitration decisions unless they are
bankrupt or in severe financial distress”).
197. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial
Arbitration, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2009) (recognizing that private ordering is
not dichotomous and hybrid choices between purely formal adjudication in public courts and
completely private adjudication in industry trade arbitrations is possible). For instance, Eric
A. Feldman has described dispute resolution among Japanese merchants participating in the
tuna auction at the Tokyo Central Wholesale Market. See generally Eric A. Feldman, The
Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 313
(2006). Unlike the merchants studied by Professor Bernstein, the Tokyo tuna merchants
resolve disputes in a government-sponsored, albeit highly specialized, court. See id. at 332–
44.
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arbitration or otherwise simplify choice of forum and choice of law issues
for the few occasions when courts might be used.
This prediction may explain, or help to explain, the “procedural dog that
has not barked” problem. 198 At first glance, existing studies on procedural
contracting suggest that the practice is rare—at least outside of coarse,
modular customizations.199 This finding makes sense if the vast majority of
contracts fall within the low uncertainty, high-scale domain. A random
sampling would include a majority of contracts in this domain and suggest
that procedural customizations are rare and minor. But this conclusion
derives from transaction type, not contract design. Simply put, in this
domain, because written contracts are not that important for any purpose,
contract design, including procedural customization, is of little significance.
This story would explain Professor Weidemaier’s conclusions. Nearly
56% of the data set in Professor Weidemaier’s seminal study involves
manufacturing or supply agreements, many (most) of which very likely fall
within the low uncertainty, high-scale domain. 200 Another 22% are
distribution agreements, at least some of which also likely fall within this
domain. 201 Accordingly, his conclusion that few parties customize
procedure, although accurate, reflects only the reasonable practices of
parties in the largest commercial party contracting domain. Because
contract design plays a minimal role in the context where these contracting
parties operate, the data does not necessarily reflect the frequency and value
of procedural contracting in domains that experience higher levels of
uncertainty and opportunism risk.
2. Low Uncertainty, Low Scale—Slightly More Risk of Litigation
Opportunism
When scale declines and uncertainty stays low, parties are unable to
benefit from standardized solutions because their contracting needs are
somewhat unique. This happens in uncomplicated markets with relatively
few participants. The low degree of uncertainty allows parties to create
state-contingent, bespoke contracts.202 Effectively, parties provide their own
clarity about the terms of performance within the contract, limiting the need

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
Weidemaier, supra note 18, at 1908 & tbl.2.
Id.
Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 31.
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for adjudicators to look beyond the four corners of the document. 203
Because the substantive terms are relatively unambiguous, adjudicators are
less likely to make mistakes; in turn, this dynamic curbs litigation
opportunism. As a result, parties are unlikely to invest significant time or
energy in procedural customizations.
Depending on the precise degree of uncertainty present, one might
anticipate slightly more customization than in the low-uncertainty, highscale quadrant. Specifically, this increase in customization likely arises at
the margins where more formal enforcement may be necessary. Parties
cannot depend on relational norms or industry-specific informal
enforcement mechanisms (such as trade arbitration tribunals) to the same
extent as in higher-scale markets. Although the work required to conduct a
formal adjudication on the merits should remain reasonably uncomplicated,
parties might still be able to game litigation based on the mechanics of a
lawsuit, through use of a choice of forum or choice of law provision.
Accordingly, one might expect to see more parties employing a few coarse,
modular customizations of procedure to simplify these basic mechanics.
This prediction seems to map onto the existing evidence. For instance,
Professor Scott discusses examples of patented electronic software licenses
as falling within this low uncertainty, low-scale domain.204 As he points
out, these “contract[s] can provide clear directions to a court of the context
within which the specified uses of the licensed intellectual property are to
be interpreted.”205 This happens through some combination of definitional
clauses, purpose (or “whereas”) clauses, and appended examples
provisions.206 Professor Scott does not explicitly examine the dispute
resolution provisions in the two contracts he references, but both examples
contain modular procedural customization, consistent with what the
transactional space suggests is appropriate.
203. See id. at 31–32; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation
Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 952–55 (2010).
204. See, e.g., Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 23–24
& nn.61–62 (citing and quoting Fountain Manufacturing Agreement Between Apple
Computer Inc., and SCI Systems, Inc. (May 31, 1996), http://contracts.onecle.com/
apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml [http://perma.cc/YD36-B6BS] [hereinafter Fountain
Manufacturing Agreement]) (citing Data Management Outsourcing Agreement Between
Allstate Insurance Company and Acxiom Corporation (Mar. 19, 1999), http://contracts.
onecle.com/acxiom/allstate.outsource.1999.03.19.shtml
[http://perma.cc/NAZ6-LDEA]
[hereinafter Data Management Outsourcing Agreement]).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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In the 1996 Fountain Manufacturing Agreement Between Apple
Computer Inc., and SCI Systems, Inc., the parties simply agreed to a forum
(the Northern District of California) and a choice of law (California law). 207
Similarly, in the 1999 Data Management Outsourcing Agreement Between
Allstate Insurance Company and Acxiom Corporation, the parties agreed to
an intricate series of informal dispute resolution escalation procedures. 208
But these procedures merely aimed at bolstering informal enforcement,
providing for resolution of “disputes arising in the ordinary course of the
parties performance under this Agreement . . . by those directly
involved.”209 Failing that, the contract provided for a staged escalation,
keeping dispute resolution informal and trying to steer it out of the
courts.210 In the unlikely event that the need for formal enforcement might
arise, the parties simply selected a forum and choice of law (federal or state
court in Cook County, Illinois, and Illinois law) 211 and effectuated this
choice of forum by waiving any personal jurisdiction arguments. 212
As uncertainty edges slightly higher, some parties segment their potential
disputes by carving out certain types of disputes for resolution in courts and
other types for resolution in arbitration. For instance, as Part II noted,
Professors O’Hara O’Connor and Drahozal studied at least three categories
of contracts that fit squarely within this domain: technology contracts, CEO
employment contracts, and franchise contracts.213 These three categories of
contracts address somewhat unique issues for the contracting parties.
Although those issues largely involve risk, uncertainty can creep into the
calculus. These contracts tend to provide for generic arbitration in most
disputes, with little customization of arbitration procedures. This makes
sense for the low uncertainty issues at stake. But these contracts also
carefully select carve-outs for certain categories of disputes, particularly
those related to information or intellectual property rights, where
marginally greater degrees of uncertainty might be present. 214 Professors
O’Hara O’Connor and Drahozal suggest that these carve-outs exist for a
number of reasons, including that these subcategories of disputes may have
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Fountain Manufacturing Agreement, supra note 204, ¶ 22.12.
Data Management Outsourcing Agreement, supra note 204, ¶ 21.1.
Id. ¶ 21.2.
Id. ¶ 21.3.
Id. ¶ 24.9.
Id.
See supra Part II.
See O’Hara O’Connor & Drahozal, The Essential Role, supra note 151, at 2182.
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stakes that are sufficiently high to increase the harm of litigation
opportunism—even if the probability of its occurrence remains low—and
justify additional procedural customization.215
To summarize, parties operating within contexts of low uncertainty and
low scale can usually address the risk of litigation opportunism through the
use of state-contingent contracts. Although parties might occasionally need
to rely upon formal enforcement mechanisms, they can supply courts or
general arbitration tribunals with sufficiently specified substantive terms to
simplify adjudication of the substantive terms. To the extent that some
residual risk of litigation opportunism exists, it tends to relate to the
mechanics of lawsuits—such as concerns about where the lawsuits will be
filed or what law will be applied—and parties make modular
customizations to decide these issues. As uncertainty edges higher, some
parties address the increasing hazard of litigation opportunism by making
more granular, but still modular, carve-outs for differing categories of
disputes.
3. High Uncertainty, High Scale—Moderate Risk of Litigation
Opportunism
In contexts of high uncertainty and high scale, parties are more likely to
encounter unanticipated contingencies than those conducted in a stable
environment.216 And parties struggle to identify obligations when those
contingencies materialize. Accordingly, in this environment, contract
designers increasingly use standards that take advantage of a decision
maker’s hindsight, which in turn allows for more flexibility in the
specification of rights and obligations. 217 This drafting technique
necessarily injects the possibility of ambiguity into determinations about
performance and breach and subsequently increases the potential for
harmful litigation opportunism.

215. Id. at 2182–84 (“The high stakes in at least some of the cases (such as trademark
disputes for franchisors) also are important. Parties often prefer to have courts resolve ‘betthe-company’ cases because the availability of appellate review reduces the risk of
aberrational decisions.”) (footnotes omitted) (citing Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R.
Wittrock, Is There a Flight From Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 79–80 (2008);
Drahozal & Ware, Why Do Businesses, supra note 98, at 455).
216. See Michael J. Leiblein, The Choice of Organizational Governance Form and
Performance: Predictions from Transaction Cost, Resource-Based, and Real Options
Theories, 29 J. MGMT. 937, 951–52 (2003).
217. See, e.g., Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 20, at 39.
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But in high-scale contexts, parties can ameliorate that risk by employing
established industry norms ex post to help resolve that ambiguity. Because
many contracting parties face the same (or similar) challenges, they can
pool resources to establish collective understandings. Even if these
understandings would be difficult for general courts or adjudicators to
verify, parties operating in high-scale contexts can turn to decision
makers—who may be part of specialized arbitration tribunals or courts—
with an industry-rich understanding that is sufficient to convert observable
phenomena into enforceable outcomes.218 For instance, Professor Scott has
argued that parties can turn to courts that develop experience and expertise
by adjudicating a sufficiently large number of similar disputes. 219 Examples
of such courts are Delaware Chancery courts, for corporate matters, and the
Santa Clara County Superior Court, for industrial disputes arising in Silicon
Valley. 220
In terms of procedural customization, this means that parties in high
uncertainty, high-scale environments are usually able to effectively combat
litigation opportunism through simple modular customizations of procedure
that opt into these specialized tribunals. Parties are unlikely to need (or
want) much additional customization, since these specialized decision
makers’ primary advantage is their ability to leverage hindsight to achieve
more accurate outcomes. If parties chose to impose complex procedural
customization on disputes subject to these tribunals, they would run the risk
of hamstringing these specialized adjudicators and undercutting their ability
to extract value from vague standards included in the substantive terms of
the contract.
Alternatively, parties in high-scale contexts may be able to forego most
formal enforcement altogether. For example, Professor Lisa Bernstein has
explored the ways that Midwestern original equipment manufacturers
(“OEMs”) and their suppliers use long, detailed contracts to establish space
for extra-legal modes of enforcement.221 As she recognizes, these contracts
“are artfully designed to create a framework for growing relational social
capital and leveraging network governance.” 222

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See, e.g., Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 32.
Id. at 32–34.
See id.
See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 56, at 562.
Id. at 563.
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In one sense, OEM contracts are relatively predictable, as they often
involve the supply of discrete and already-existing goods.223 But the longterm nature of these contracts, “the fact that buyers expect strict compliance
regarding quality, [the need for] on time delivery, and a host of logisticsrelated requirements” (including the interdependency of buyers on multiple
suppliers) creates high degrees of uncertainty. 224 Professor Bernstein
concludes that transacting parties have been able to confront this
uncertainty with only minimal reliance on the legal system, in large part
because the network in which they function serves as a contract governance
mechanism. 225 Practically, parties can study patterns of past alliances and
connections in the network relevant to a particular deal thereby mitigating
opportunism through reputation.226 Although there are high levels of
uncertainty, parties are able to avoid most litigation or dispute opportunism
through informal enforcement processes. Therefore, they need not turn to
much procedural customization.227
In high uncertainty, high-scale environments, parties can primarily rely
on industry-provided solutions, including specialized decision makers or
223. Professor Bernstein notes that many OEM relationships, in the modern world, also
involve elements of innovation. Id. at 610. In fact, “tapping supplier innovation . . . is the
second-highest [procurement] priority, and includes actively attracting and developing the
most innovative suppliers to help generate new ideas.” Id. (quoting Patrick Connaughton &
Christopher S. Sawchuck, 2014 Procurement Agenda: Rethinking How Procurement Defines
Its Value, Balances Risk and Gets the Most from Technology Investments, HACKETT GRP.
(Jan. 2014), http://images.insights.thehackettgroup.com/Web/TheHackettGroupInc/%7Bf5
b5061d-cadb-44dc-9b1c-6543faebc20c%7D_HCKT-2014-Procurement-Agenda.pdf?elq
track=true). To the extent that OEM relationships spin into contracts for innovation, they
may more aptly be considered collaborative innovation contracts and fall within the high
uncertainty, low scale domain discussed in the following section.
224. Id. at 578.
225. See id. at 563–65.
226. David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of
Strategic Alliances, 23 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 242, 244 (2007).
227. For instance, in the Harley-Davidson Master Supply Agreement (2015), Purchase
Order Terms and Conditions Module (one of the contracts that Professor Bernstein evaluates
in some detail), Harley-Davidson does minimal procedural customization, and all of it is
modular in nature. Harley-Davidson selects Wisconsin law (and opts out of the Convention
on the International Sale of Goods). Purchase Order Terms and Conditions, HARLEYDAVIDSON SUPPLIER NETWORK, ¶ 21(b), https://www.h-dsn.com/genbus/po_tracking.jsp (last
visited Apr. 7, 2020). It selects Milwaukee County Circuit Court for the State of Wisconsin
or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin as the forum. Id. ¶
21(d). The only other customizations bolster the choice of forum. For instance, HarleyDavidson includes a waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction. Id.
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network governance that enhances informal enforcement mechanisms, to
confront litigation opportunism. Existing procedural customization
practices tend to direct disputes to specialized decision makers through
choice of forum clauses, including arbitration clauses. In circumstances
where there might be various categories of disputes that could benefit from
differential treatment, parties can use more atomistic carve-outs to modify
their dispute resolution processes. Finally, in arbitration, parties still might
tailor procedure to a certain degree, especially when it comes to decision
makers’ qualifications or expertise.
4. High Uncertainty, Low Scale—High Risks of Litigation Opportunism
Parties are most likely to benefit from (and thus most likely to seek)
bespoke procedural systems in innovation-oriented contracts, where
uncertainty is high and scale is low. 228 These environments include co- or
joint-development contracts, research and development collaborations,
OEM contracts that include going improvement and development
provisions, or new services innovations. 229 In such environments, parties
cannot hope to specify all (or even a meaningful set of) potential
circumstances in which the contract might be performed, or the actions the
parties might take. Moreover, the changes caused by persistent innovation
and the limited number of market actors undermine the capacity of any
market or industry to develop shared understandings. As a result, frequent,
and sometimes even good-faith, disagreements occur about what constitutes
proper performance or an appropriate response to conditions that arise ex
post.
This pervasive uncertainty means that parties often contract to provide a
framework for their collaboration, rather than to guarantee a particular
outcome. In these contracts for innovation, formal enforcement plays an
important and focused role. For instance, Professors Hadfield and Bozovic
describe formal enforcement mechanisms as “scaffolding” for informal
enforcement norms.230 Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott argue for the
228. A distinction should be made between contracts for innovation and contracts about
innovation. Some contracts, in other words, provide the framework within which innovation
takes place, while other contracts are more conventional and address the protection, transfer,
licensing, or other use of extra-contractual innovations.
229. See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 992–95.
230. Id. at 988 (“In our framework, formal contracting provides essential scaffolding to
support the beliefs and strategies that make informal means of enforcement such as
reputation and the threat of termination effective.”).
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imposition of “low-powered” sanctions in the event of a breach of the
formal aspects of a collaborative contract.231 Low-powered enforcement
imposes formal remedies for “red-faced” violations of the agreement to
provide a prioritized opportunity, but it does not impose sanctions for
failure to reach particular outcomes. 232
Both approaches view trust as emerging endogenously from the parties’
relationship, with formal enforcement provisions playing a limited but
critical role by requiring certain information sharing. Professors Bozovic
and Hadfield postulate that trust grows as the parties proceed with the
relationship and continually refer back to the documents that created the
relationship to evaluate one another’s performance. 233 Professors Gilson,
Sabel, and Scott contend that informal constraints become effective as the
collaboration progresses and relevant metrics of performance become more
observable. 234 Additionally, the continuing revelation of information and
ongoing relationship increases switching costs, making it more likely that
the parties will informally solve problems to maintain the collaboration. 235
In collaborative contracts, legal enforcement should (and does) take a
back seat to informal alternatives, but it remains foundational to the
functioning of the alliance. Default procedural rules frequently fail to
satisfy the parties’ objectives, given the unique needs of both sanctioning
some specific behavior while also encouraging the development of informal
norms. Because only a limited number of parties have similar needs, courts
struggle to supply accurate substantive terms ex post, and open-ended
public procedural rules, which give tremendous discretion to judges,
magnify this shortcoming.236
231. See, e.g., Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 37, at 1427–31.
232. See id. at 1417.
233. See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 22, at 988 (“In our framework, formal
contracting provides essential scaffolding to support the beliefs and strategies that make
informal means of enforcement such as reputation and the threat of termination effective.”).
234. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 37, at 1384 (“We focus on the fact
that contracting parties can and do agree on formal contracts for exchanging information
about the progress and prospects of their joint activities, and that these same information
exchanges provide the foundation for raising the existing level of trust. It is this informationsharing regime that braids the formal and informal elements of the contract, endogenizes
trust, and thereby supports the informal enforcement of the parties’ substantive
performance.”).
235. See id.
236. See, e.g., Blair, Promise and Peril, supra note 14, at 800 (“[T]he reformers opted to
entrust judges with broad discretion to put the rules of procedure into action in individual
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Procedure, in other words, amplifies worries that formal enforcement
will crowd out the development of essential informal norms. It makes
sense, then, that parties confronting the dilemmas of contracting in
environments of high uncertainty and low scale would rely on bespoke
procedural regimes to help resolve disputes reliably and at an acceptable
cost.237 This reliance, in fact, is precisely what researchers see in practice.
As Part II-C observes, parties to alliance agreements regularly create
intricate procedural regimes.238 These complex, multi-tiered dispute
resolution regimes are highly customized to augment and reinforce other
substantive governance mechanisms without crowding out the growth of
informal norms.239
For instance, in a recent alliance agreement between Frequency
Therapeutics, Inc. and Astellas Pharma, Inc., the parties established a
framework for the development, manufacture, and commercialization of a
new regenerative therapy for hearing loss. 240 Their dispute resolution
system distributes different conflicts to different parties and decision
makers, with most common disputes regarding details of the collaboration
first being sent to a Joint Steering Committee (“JSC”).241 If a routine
disagreement cannot be resolved by the JSC, it gets escalated to the
executive officers, who then attempt to resolve it informally. 242 Failing such
informal resolution, a standard dispute proceeds to a binding arbitration that

cases.”) (footnote omitted). See generally Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition:
Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005) (noting how the Rules retrieved equity as a source of
procedural discretion); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure,
78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003) (arguing for broad use of equitable discretion).
237. See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 37
(advancing a similar argument with respect to the design of substantive terms).
238. See supra Section II.C.
239. Jennejohn, The Private Order, supra note 15, at 362 (“Establishing a constellation
of enforcement institutions appears to be a common strategy among collaborations.”).
240. See License and Collaboration Agreement by and Between Frequency Therapeutics,
Inc. and Astellas Pharma, Inc., ¶ 1.95 (July 16, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1703647/000119312519239976/d72917dex1012.htm
[hereinafter
License
and
Collaboration Agreement]; see also GlobalData Healthcare, Astellas Pharma and Frequency
Therapeutics Collaborate on Hearing Loss Therapy, VERDICT MED. DEVICES (July 31,
2019), https://www.medicaldevice-network.com/comment/fx-322-hearing-loss-therapy/.
241. See License and Collaboration Agreement, supra note 240, ¶¶ 3.02(f), 3.09.
242. Id. ¶¶ 3.09, 3.10.
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uses a simplified baseball procedure and severely constrains opportunities
to gather and produce evidence. 243
In contrast, more serious disputes about alleged material breaches,
failures of payments, or the validity of agreements do not go through the
JSC at all. The executive officers may attempt to resolve such disputes
informally, but should those efforts fail, these disputes proceed to
conventional arbitration before a three-arbitrator tribunal operating under
the rules and auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce. 244 If
these more serious disputes involve scientific or technical matters, the
arbitrators must have industry expertise. 245
Like the serious disputes discussed above, those involving intellectual
property rights also bypass the JSC. Executive officers may attempt to
resolve these disputes, but those that evade internal resolution are presented
to a court or patent office of a country where the patent was issued, or
where the patent application was filed. 246 Finally, either party may file a
claim in a U.S. court to seek injunctive relief to protect other intellectual
property rights.247
The Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. and Astellas Pharma, Inc. alliance
agreement establishes an intricate system of informal and formal dispute
resolution that sorts potential disputes into different categories before
filtering them through individuated layers of dispute resolution. The system
encourages informal resolution of routine disagreements by providing
multiple opportunities that exist outside formal mechanisms. This fosters
trust by focusing on communication and information sharing, and thus
reinforcing the substantive goals of the collaboration. In the somewhat
unlikely event that routine disputes are not resolved informally, the
simplified baseball arbitration procedure helps protect the cooperative
venture from being derailed by costly and time-consuming post-dispute
opportunism related to minor disagreements. The agreement also
recognizes, however, that more serious disputes require different
mechanisms and directs them to decision makers who have relevant
expertise or injunctive powers.
A collaboration agreement between Vir Biotechnology, Inc. and
Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for the therapeutic for the treatment of
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. ¶ 16.01(d).
Id. ¶ 16.01(c).
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.01(e).
Id. ¶ 16.01(c).
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chronic Hepatitis B provides a similar example. 248 This agreement similarly
distributes common disputes to executive officers. It then trifurcates where
disputes next go for resolution. Common categories of disputes are resolved
by expedited baseball arbitration.249 Notably, this expedited process limits
discovery and relies on the parties’ appointed representative experts, who,
in turn, select a neutral expert to serve as the arbitrator.250 While the parties
have no direct contact with the neutral expert arbitrator, the arbitrator may
consult with the parties’ appointed experts.251 With respect to certain
“excluded claims” related to intellectual property rights, parties must go to
a court of competent jurisdiction where the right arose, was created, or can
be legally regulated.252 For other serious disputes, the contract then allows
parties to choose between litigating in a court of competent jurisdiction or
arbitrating.253 If the parties opt for arbitration, the contract provides details
about the arbitral process, including the limited scope of discovery. 254
Like the Frequency Therapeutics alliance agreement, the Vir
Biotechnology agreement sorts potential disputes into different categories.
This has the particular benefit of sending most minor disputes through an
expedited baseball arbitration. By removing most of the discovery process,
limiting presentation of evidence, and streamlining adjudication, the parties
to the Vir Biotechnology agreement have cabined most post-dispute
litigation opportunism while still allowing for the streamlined resolution of
nettlesome disagreements.
To summarize, in contexts of high uncertainty but low scale, parties
already invest more resources ex ante to draft complicated, substantive
contracts that are designed to foster and develop trust over time. These
parties employ careful and thoughtful procedural customizations to ensure
that enforcement mechanisms support their substantive goals without
crowding out the development of informal, relational norms.

248. See Collaboration and License Agreement By and Among Vir Biotechnology, Inc.
and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1706431/000119312519236592/d755217dex1017.htm.
249. See id. ¶ 13.3.
250. Id. ¶ 13.2(a)–(c).
251. See id. ¶ 13.3.
252. See id. ¶ 13.2(f).
253. Id. ¶¶ 13.1, 13.2.
254. See id. ¶ 13.2(a)–(e).
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Conclusion
Despite a vast contract theory literature, scholars are only just scratching
the surface of understanding how parties design their contracts in the real
world.255 This shortfall is particularly true of procedural customizations.
Contrary to early commentators’ estimates, parties sometimes engage in a
diverse range of procedural customization. The challenge, though, has been
identifying and explaining the patterns of ex ante procedural contracting.
This Article has argued that the first step toward understanding the ways
that transactional designers harness the potential of procedural autonomy is
to recognize that procedural customization functions best to offset litigation
opportunism. By systematically considering the way various forms of
procedural customization function to limit or eliminate litigation
opportunism, this Article has taken an important step in helping identify the
circumstances when customizations of procedure can be valuable as
additional governance tools.
Utilizing this Article’s typology of procedural innovation, which
considered the degree of environmental and behavioral uncertainty present
and the frequency with which other similar parties contract in the same
domain, commentators can more easily predict the degree of procedural
modification in contracts.
In environments of low uncertainty but high scale, parties have little
need for formal, detailed contracts, structuring their relationships instead
through relational norms. Because written contracts do modest work and
parties place little reliance on formal enforcement, contract designers need
not invest much in procedural customizations. At most, designers in this
domain might make a few coarse, modular customizations aimed at
simplifying choice of forum and law decisions, in the rare event business
solutions break down and the parties turn to courts or arbitrators. As scale
drops, parties in low uncertainty environments can no longer rely on
standardized solutions, but they can draft substantively state-contingent
contracts at reasonably low costs. This customization keeps the risk of
litigation opportunism in check. Consequently, little need for precise
procedural tailoring exists. Parties can, instead, mostly rely on the default
rules of procedure. To the extent that any customization makes costeffective sense, that customization tends to be coarse and simple, aimed at
streamlining adjudication and curbing extreme litigation abuses.

255. See Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, supra note 32, at 2–3.
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When uncertainty increases, parties in a high-scale market tend to be
able to address future contingencies and their inherent risks by choosing
decision makers with specialized expertise or relying on network
governance—an interconnected web of relationships with similarly situated
parties. In these high-uncertainty but high-scale environments, parties rely
on more detailed and transactionally particularized contracts but engage in
relatively limited procedural customization. To the extent that such
customization exists, it tends to be modular, often opting out of courts and
into arbitration. Given the importance of the decision maker’s expertise,
however, parties more frequently tweak the details of the arbitral process,
including arbitrator expertise, in order to assure that a decision maker has
relevant industry expertise and sensitivity to the parties’ circumstances.
Parties also sometimes make more atomistic carve-outs for certain
categories of disputes.
In contrast, as uncertainty rises but scale declines—that is, as the
business environment becomes more innovative—parties cannot confront
increasing exchange hazards through common industry norms. Meanwhile,
parties also struggle to specify obligations and rights ex ante. These actors
rely more heavily on lawyers and contracts to supply substantive
obligations, but those obligations are often framed vaguely, opening the
door to litigation opportunism. To confront that opportunism, parties invest
in greater tailoring of the procedural mechanisms that reinforce, maintain,
and decide the integrity of those obligations. The degree of that tailoring
roughly correlates to the degree of uncertainty and scale at issue.
While untested in its own right, conclusions predicted by this fourdomain typology seem to correspond with most of the empirical data
scholars have about procedural contracting. But perhaps the most
significant advance this Article proposes is providing a roadmap for future,
more particularized, empirical work to test the key hypothesis that
procedural innovation will vary in relation to the mix of uncertainty and
market scale of a given commercial transaction.
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